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iMote by the secretariat 
The secretariat has thought it appropriate to revise and update the 
study entitled "Basic aspects of latin American development strategy" 
that was presented to the Commission at its thirteenth session. It is 
distributing the revised version of the study at the present session 
because the topics it deals with, in particular the process of economic 
and social development in latin America and the basic aspects and 
objectives of development policy and strategy, are of cardinal importance 
for discussions on agenda item 5> which concerns latin America and the 
Second United Nations Development Decade. 
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DEVELOPMENT IN THE PAST DECADE: EXPERIENCE AND PROSPECTS 
1. Experience in the past decade 
Various developments and trends are characteristic of Latin 
America's experience in the 1960s. It is not easy to summarize them 
from an over-all standpoint, since they present features which are 
often contradictory, and they reflect progress and favourable changes 
side by side with obvious weaknesses and deficiencies. 
Certain general points are fairly clear, however. One is that 
the rate of growth of the region, and of most of the countries* economies, 
despite improvements in individual cases, has stayed more or less at 
the levels reached in previous periods, and has not caught up with that 
of the more dynamic economies in other regions. .This fact stands out all 
the more in the light of the population increase* as a result of which 
Latin America has shown one of the least favourable trends, only those of 
Africa and east and south-east Asia being still less favourable. 
If account is taken of the acceleration in growth rates during 
the past three years, the gross domestic product of the region as a 
whole has grown at an average annual rate of 2.5 per cent. The over-all 
picture naturally conceals marked disparities between countries. Only 
seven attained the over-all growth target set by the Alliance for Progress. 
Another all-important point relates to the general trend of 
Latin America's foreign trade. Although the increase in regional exports 
was by no means insignificant, particularly in the last years of the 
decade (see table 2), it reflects only partly the exceptional growth of 
world trade during that period. Furthermore, Latin America fs share in the 
volume of trade declined in relation to that of the more dynamic regions, 
such as the European Economic Community (EEC), the United States and Japan. 
/Table 1 
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Table 1 
LATIN AMERICA: AVERAGE ANNUAL RATS OF GROWTH OF THE GROSS 
DOMESTIC PRODUCT AT FACTOR COST, 1960-1970 a/ 
(Percentages) 
Total Per capita 
product product 
Argentina 3.7 2.1 
Bolivia 5*6 3.2 
Brazil 5.8 2„9 
Chile 4.3 1.8 
Colombia 5.2 U 8 
Costa Rica 6.8 2.9 
Cuba • • . ... 
Dominican Republic 3.7 0.4 
Ecuador - 4.6 1.2 
El Salvador 5.8 2.5 
Guatemala 5.2 2.2 
Haiti 0.5 -1.8 
Honduras 5.2 1.7 
Mexico 7.2 3.6 
Nicaragua 6.7 3.6 
Panama 8.0 4.6 
Paraguay- 4.4 1.1 
Peru 4.9 1.7 
Uruguay 1.3 -0.1 
Venezuela 5.8 2.4 
L a t i n America h i hl 
Source: ECLA, on t h e b a s i s o f o f f i c i a l s t a t i s t i c s , 
a / P r o v i s i o n a l e s t i m a t e s , s u b j e c t t o r e v i s i o n , 
b / F igures f o r t h e p e r i o d 1960-1969. 
/Table 2 
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Table 2 
SHARE OP PRINCIPAL &BGI0NS kW COWRIES IN TOTAL WORLD EXPORTS, 1?60 AKB 1969 
(ill 11 Ions of dollars f«o.b.) 
i960 1969 
Value of expor t s 
i n 1960-1969 
Value 
P e r c e n t -
age Value 








T o t a l 126 3U0 100.0 271 100 100.0 U4t<5 . J i i 
Developed r eg ions and oouf i t r ies 31 001 64.1 183 611 , 67.7 126.7 9.5 
United S t a t e s 20 1*12 16,1 37 i|t|i[ 13.8 83.^ 7.0 
Canada 5 554 4.4 13 796 5.1 10.6 
European Eoonomlo Community 29 7^0 23.5 75 560 27.9 iS'-f.l 10.9 
European F ree Trade Area 18 m o 14.6 35 700 13.1 93-2 7*6 
Japan 055 3.2 15 991 5.9 16.5 
Osearila a / 2 760 2.2 5 120 1.9 85*5 7.1 
Developing Regions 26 212 20.7 47 954 17*7 82.9 6.9 
L a t i n America 9 012 7 . 1 14 304 5.3 58.7 5.3 
Asia 7 630 6.0 12 820 ,4.7 68.0 5.9 
A f r i c a 5 300 1.2 11 480 4.2 116,6 9.0 
Kidd le fiast 270 3.4 9 350 3.5 119.0 9.1 
Count r i e s w i t h o e n t r a l l y - p l a n n e d 
economies 13 24o 10.5 27 900 10.3 110.7 8.6 
Other r eg ions end c o u n t r i e s 5 887 4.7 U 635 4.3 97*6 7.9 
Source ; United N a t i o n s , Monthly B u l l e t i n of S t a t i s t i c s ! f o r i960, vol« 22, N° 6 (June I968); 
f o r 1569, v o l , 25, N« 2 (February 1971). 
A u s t r a l i a and New Zealand* 
/In addition 
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In addition, this trend was accompanied by other important factors, 
such as the deterioration in the terms of trade; little diversification 
of exports, which still consist mainly of a few primary products; the 
region's marked dependence on imports of capital goods and basic inputs; 
and a high degree of concentration in the geographical distribution of 
trade.^-
Another point which must be mentioned is that thé external financial 
position of the latin American countries is highly vulnerable and is 
becoming more so. Their indebtedness has more than doubled, and service 
payments absorb an excessive proportion of their exports, to the point 
where remittances of profits and interest, and amortization and other 
payments on foreign capital, have come to represent over 35 per cent 
of the current value of exports of goods and services for the region as 
a whole, 
Another matter of grave concern is the volume and the spread of 
private foreign investment in the acquisition of Latin American enterprises 
engaged in traditional economic, financial or other activities, without 
there being any technical or other justification for these foreign take-
overs and the weakening of Latin American enterprises. 
There are, however, some important positive developments, which 
include the advances made in economic and social research; the efforts 
to integrate development problems in a more fruitful interdisciplinary 
context than in the past; a firmer and more widespread conviction of the 
need for institutional and structural changes; a greater understanding 
and practical knowledge of development problems; and the technical 
competence that Latin America has shown in its attempts to organize 
planning and the preparation of plans, notwithstanding the difficulties 
and lack of previous experience in this field. 
1/ See ECLA, Economic Survey of Latin America, 1963 (United Nations 
~ publication, Sales N°: E»70.II.G.l),Part One, Chapter III, and 
Economic Survey of latin America, 1969 (United Nations publication 





Attention must also be drawn to the progress made in public sector 
planning, firmer action in curbing inflation, the launching of agrarian 
reform programmes in some countries, and the extension of social services 
in respect of education, health and housing» 
Outstanding developments at the regional level were the policy 
decisions which set in motion the regional integration processes and the 
institutions designed to promote development, including the Intor-American 
Development Bank (IDB). Particularly significant was the co-ordinated 
action of the latin American Governments in the discussions of foreign 
trade and financing, especially in relation to UNCTAD's activities. 
The financial and technical co-operation programme of the Alliance 
for Progress represented the first attempt at organization to ensure the 
external co-operation required for national development plans, although 
it was eventually frustrated by a combination of factors. Particularly 
during its initial stage, this programme gave impetus to planning; it 
established economic and social development goals; and it encouraged the 
channelling of external resources towards the participating countries* 
While there is no denying these and other advances, there is still 
a feeling of profound disquiet regarding the ultimate course of Latin 
American development, founded on the fact that social unrest and conflict 
have been aggravated, and on the realisation that the long-standing 
obstacles to economic growth have taken on new dimensions and characteristics. 
In actual fact, at the close of the 1960s, the regional economies were 
far from having established the basic institutions and structures that 
would ensure more definite and stable progress. There is therefore a 
growing conviction that the effectiveness of the growth model and of 
national economic and financial policies needs to be evaluated, and the 
shortcomings of international co-operation and the severe limitations 
which the industrial countries1 policy places on the development of the 
Latin American countries must be recognised. 
Per a more accurate view of Latin America's situation it seems 
essential to examine some particular features and consequences of the 
development process, which show the sharp disparities or disequilibria 




It is not easy to generalize in latin America because of the 
different stages of development and the wide range of economic and social 
structures to be found in the countries of the region. Some aggregate 
figures may be considered, however, since they are indicative of essential 
aspects of the economic and social situation prevailing , in the Latin 
American countries. The precarious conditions they indicate may be worse 
than they really are in a few countries, but at the same time they err on 
the side of understatement about the conditions prevailing in the others. 
The over-all magnitude of Latin America's economic and technological 
backwardness is reflected in the estimated figure for the average product 
per person employed, which is barely 1,400 dollars. This productivity 
ratio is one-quarter to one-sixth of that recorded in industrialized 
countries like the United States and those of Western Europe. The low 
average is undoubtedly determined by the minimal productivity of a large 
proportion of the economically active population which may be regarded 
as structurally unemployed. The scale and nature of this backwardness 
stand out even more clearly, however, when they are considered in the 
light of the fact that probably less than 10 per cent of the labour force 
is employed in enterprises or units which may be termed relatively up to 
date in Latin America, and which produce about 50 per cent of total 
output, while at the other end of the scale one-third of total employed 
manpower accounts for possibly less than 10 per cent of the aggregate 
product. 
These differences in productivity levels, which were observable 
in the past between rural and urban activities, are becoming more and more 
pronounced in all economic sectors. In the more advanced industrialized 
economies there are also sizable disparities in the product per person 
employed in different economic activities, but in those countries they 
occur at much higher levels and are not so marked as they are in the 
Latin American countries, nor do they affect such large sectors of the 
population, particularly in the rural subsistence sectors and marginal 
urban activities. Moreover, in the region they are linked to other factors 




Productivity increases very slowly and very unequally in different 
sectors, and even in different strata of the same economic activity. 
Thus, in the rural subsistence sectors and in various urban services, the 
product per employed person is virtually at a standstill or is even 
diminishing, on account of the pressure of surplus manpower. The course 
of events has been very different in the industrialised countries, where 
there is a tremendous dynamism which extends to all activities. The 
growth rate of latin America fs over-all productivity is half that of 
many industrialized countries, and even less than half that of those of 
Japan and some of the socialist countries. These disparities are 
particularly striking in the agricultural sector, whose backwardness is 
one of the most serious problems of latin American development. 
Productivity is a highly complex problem in Latin America. In the 
industrialized countries, increases in productivity are constantly being 
favoured - in broader and more diversified markets - by the improved 
techniques which they themselves develop; in the developing countries, 
any long-term improvement depends fundamentally on capital formation, 
better manpower training and organisation, the expansion of domestic 
markets, and access to external markets. 
The weakness of the Latin American economic process is apparent in 
its inability to absorb the working population in productive employment. 
This is undoubtedly due to the slackening of the economic growth rate since 
the mid-1950s and the fact that the population growth rate is the highest 
in the world. Other factors which are bound up with the conditions and 
structure of the latin American economies and the patterns of income 
distribution have had a particular influence on structural unemployment, 
as will be seen later in this survey. 
A study of the position in I960, the conclusions of xdiich are no 
doubt still valid, showed that about 40 per cent of Latin America's 
economically active manpower was underemployed, openly unemployed, employed 
in what are to all intents and purposes unproductive services, or in 
minimally productive activities. This section of the labour force included 
workers on sub-family agricultural units, artisan-type workers and the 
superfluous staff employed in trade and general services. This was the 
/state of 
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state of affairs in agriculture, in trade and other services, including 
government, and, on a lesser scale, in artisan-type industry and construction. 
The low average product per person employed, the marked disparities 
in productivity in all economic activities and the scale of structural 
unemployment are three interrelated factors which account for the low average 
of income prevailing in the region. Together with the other factors 
connected with income distribution, they also explain the extreme inequality 
in the distribution of income and, consequently, of consumption. Although 
there are appreciable differences between countries - Argentina having the 
highest income and the least inequitable income distribution - the over-all 
figures are useful in assessing the magnitude of the problem. In real 
terms, average per capita personal income is only about 410 dollars a year; 
but while for half the population the per capita average is probably some 
120 dollars, for the upper strata, representing 5 per cent of the population, 
it is 2,600 dollars. 
Consumption in the low-income strata comprising 50 per cent of the 
population represents only two-tenth of total consumption, while three-
tenths are absorbed by the upper 5 per cent. In other words, while the 
bulk of the population subsists under the unsatisfactory material and 
cultural conditions shown by these indexes, a relatively small proportion 
has attained a level and range of consumption similar to those found in 
countries with much higher incomes. Although these figures cover differences 
in income and consumption between the countries of the region, in some of 
which these disparities may be less pronounced, and although they are the 
result of preliminary estimates based only on the incomplete data available, 
there is no doubt that they indicate orders of magnitude that bear out the 
seriousness of latin America's economic and social problem. 
/2. The 
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2. The basic causes of the lack of economic dynamism 
and, the social disequilibrium 
The lessons of the 1960s have again shown that the basic causes 
of Latin America fs economic and social backwardness are deeply rooted in 
the operation and structure of the econoiny. Unless something is done to 
remedy them, it will be impossible to speed up the process of development 
and achieve a more equitable pattern of income distribution which will, 
after a reasonable lapse of time, enable the "other half" of the latin 
American people to join actively in the production process, appreciably 
improve their living conditions and find a place in an effective plan for 
social development. 
It is not proposed here to describe in detail the economic, social 
and institutional factors that are blocking the development of the latin 
American countries, but rather to draw attention to the more generalized 
structural factors, even though they differ in degree from one country to 
another. 
(a) Political and institutional conditions 
The basic causes of Latin America's lack of dynamism and economic 
and social backwardness must be sought largely in the organization and 
functioning of the latin American societies. These causes consist 
essentially in the low pace of political and social change and the 
opposition to the establishment of new institutional conditions that would 
facilitate the key decisions required for development, and also in the 
sluggish reaction to changing conditions of international trade. All this 
is highly significant because, although the possibility exists of adopting 
fundamental development measures, the determination to carry them through 
on the necessary scale is lacking. 
Experience in the 1960s has been illuminating in regard to the 
decisive importance of these factors for development. For example, 
national planning, which was initiated so enthusiastically, has not been 
so effective as could have been desired, because in practice it merely 
represented an added official administrative component of a traditional 
political and social decision-making structure in which there was no 




m a t t e r s . Although t h e t e c h n i c a l e f f i c i e n c y o f governments improved, major 
d e c i s i o n s were n o t pushed through so r a p i d l y o r so comprehens ive ly a s was 
r e q u i r e d , s imply b e c a u s e t h e c o n d i t i o n s t h a t would make them f e a s i b l e 
d id n o t e x i s t . T h i s i s i l l u s t r a t e d by t h e s l o w p r o g r e s s o f a g r a r i a n 
reform programmes and t h e v a c i l l a t i o n and o p p o s i t i o n w i t h which t h e y have 
met; t h e f a i l u r e t o adopt bank and f i n a n c i a l reforms and t o i n t r o d u c e 
s u b s t a n t i a l changes i n t h e e x i s t i n g t a x sys tems; t h e absence o f n a t i o n a l 
p o l i c i e s w i t h r e s p e c t t o f o r e i g n i n v e s t m e n t , which, among o t h e r r e s u l t s , 
i s opening t h e way f o r f o r e i g n t a k e - o v e r s and t h e weakening o f n a t i o n a l 
e n t e r p r i s e s ; and, l a s t l y , t h e o b s t a c l e s t o t h e expans ion o f i n t r a - r e g i o n a l 
t r a d e and t o t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f a more c o m p e t i t i v e and more e f f i c i e n t 
economic sys tem a r i s i n g from t h e s i t u a t i o n s c r e a t e d . In f a c t , what are 
g e n e r a l l y c o n s i d e r e d a s o b s t a c l e s t o development are l a r g e l y t h e outcome 
o f t h o s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , and p o l i t i c a l and i n s t i t u t i o n a l changes are 
n e c e s s a r y i f t h e y a r e t o be overcome, 
(b) Spread and c o n c e n t r a t i o n o f t e c h n i c a l p r o g r e s s 
The narked c o n t r a s t s i n p r o d u c t i v i t y l e v e l s i n the economic s t r u c t u r e 
o f L a t i n America may be a s c r i b e d t o t h e vary ing degree o f t e c h n i c a l p r o g r e s s 
and a b s o r p t i o n o f new t e c h n i q u e s i n t h e d i f f e r e n t economic s e c t o r s and 
branches o f a c t i v i t y . 
Absorpt ion o f t e c h n i c a l know-how has never been a widespread p r o c e s s 
i n L a t i n America, nor has i t reached a l l s e c t o r s o f a c t i v i t y o r a l l s t r a t a 
o f t h e labour f o r c e . Throughout t h e range from the t r a d i t i o n a l e x p o r t e r 
e n c l a v e t o t h e newly c r e a t e d i n d u s t r i a l produc t ion u n i t s , t e c h n i c a l 
p r o g r e s s has u s u a l l y r e p r e s e n t e d a l i m i t e d form o f modern iza t ion which , 
w i t h t h e p r o d u c t i v i t y and income i t i s capable o f g e n e r a t i n g , has g i v e n 
shape t o a modern s e c t o r t h a t i s s e p a r a t e d by a g r e a t g u l f from t h e r e s t 
o f t h e economy* 
For such a s y s t e m t o be e f f e c t i v e over t h e l o n g term, the modern 
s e c t o r would have t o expand p r o g r e s s i v e l y and i n c o r p o r a t e an i n c r e a s i n g 
p r o p o r t i o n of t h e a c t i v e p o p u l a t i o n ; but t h i s p r o c e s s h a s not been 
s u f f i c i e n t l y i n t e n s i v e i n l a t i n America, 
/As t h e 
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As the productivity and income gap between the modern sector and 
the rest of the economy has widened, other factors which accentuate that 
disparity have gradually been strengthened» In other words, the very 
dynamism of the process tends to strengthen this pattern of growth, and it 
is superimposed on other factors which are characteristic of earlier phases 
in latin American development. For example, from this point of view there 
was no great difference between what has been called outward-directed 
growth and inward-directed growth; when exports were the main stimulus to 
growth, the modern sector expanded principally on the basis of export 
activities and supplementary foreign trade services, which had little effect 
on the rest of the economy. Subsequently, the prevailing trend towards 
import substitution mainly favoured industrial development, but again 
through the establishment of new modern units which were superimposed on a 
whole slowly evolving economic structure. For the same reason, the transition 
from the first to the second stage did not change but rather consolidated 
the high degree of geographical concentration of economic activity, since 
the major urban centres became the most suitable locations for the 
installation of new modern activities« 
(c) Capital formation and income distribution 
For economic and social development, the essentials are an immediate 
increase in the product per economically active person and a structure 
which is capable of absorbing manpower while stepping up the growth rate 
of productivity and income, especially in the social sectors which are 
Egging behind. These aims can be achieved only by accelerating capital 
formation, spreading modern technical know-how and introducing more efficient 
forms of production̂  training the labour force and ensuring that resources 
are allocated for specific economic and social ends» 
In Latin America aggregate capital formation is relatively low. 
During the 1960s the coefficient of gross fixed investment, discounting 
changes in stocks, was 17 per cent, which is less than in countries with 
a higher economic growth rate, but is quite high given the average level 
of income in the region. There is such a high concentration of income in 
the upper social strata, however, that the coefficient could be much 
higher were it not for the high consumption levels in those strata. 
/Moreover, if 
E/CN.12/83 6/Rev. 1 ' 
Page 12 
Moreover, if the high relative prices of capital goods compared with 
consumer goods are adjusted, and investment is calculated at its true 
value, the gross investment coefficient will probably not be more than 
12 per cent. 
This coefficient would seem to indicate that the capital-output 
ratio is more favourable in Latin America than in other developing areas. 
It signifies an average historical gross marginal ratio of 2.5> whereas 
it is more than 3 in many developing countries. While this index 
undoubtedly reflects the general shortage of capital resources in relation 
to the labour force, it has also been influenced by the distorted economic 
structure in latin America, in which a large proportion of the social 
product derives from the abnormally high absorption of surplus manpower in 
trade, financial services and other general services, including government 
activities. 
Apart from the shortage of capital, there is another fundamental 
problem connected with its sectoral distribution, that is, with the 
structure of investment. The large proportion accounted for by consumption 
in the high-income groups has an impact on demand for goods which come 
into the category of luxury items in comparison with the average living 
level of the vast majority of the people, particularly in so far as durable 
consumer goods are concerned. This distribution of resources limits the 
subsequent extension and magnitude of the potential social effects which 
the development process should be producing at the stage it has reached 
in Latin America. It is essentially a cumulative process in which the 
concentration of income stimulates demand for certain items and keeps 
demand for consumer goods low in the poorer population groups. 
The resources which are directly or indirectly assigned to satisfying 
the needs of the high-income groups reduce the amount available for 
investment in the traditional industries producing consumer goods in popular 
demand, such as food and clothing, and for expanding the social services 
that should be provided by the State, namely, housing and education. They 
also curtail production and imports of essential intermediate and capital 
goods which would raise productivity in the more backward sectors of the 




The establishment of durable consumer goods industries, which has 
proceeded apace, especially in the countries with a more advanced industrial 
sector, has undoubtedly had a multiplier effect on other economic activities 
to some extent or other, depending on the proportion of domestically 
produced inputs used, and has created a wide variety of new activities 
which have had their effect on the industrial skills available in the 
Latin American countries. However, the point at issue here is whether the 
potential economic and social effects would not have been greater if such 
resources had been earmarked for the other purposes envisaged or for 
building up an industrial structure capable of competing on the world 
market for manufactures and semi-manufactures. 
If those resources had been used in other ways, as suggested, they 
would have provided the national economies with a broader base for expansion, 
made income distribution more equitable and helped to eliminate, or at 
least ease, the external bottleneck through which development must force 
its way. 
(d) Agricultural production 
The institutional, social and economic conditions prevailing in the 
agricultural sector are one of the most formidable obstacles that Latin 
American development has.had to face. In spite of the shift of population 
towards the towns, a large proportion of the structural unemployment that 
exists is still found in rural areas, and this, added to low wage levels, 
keeps the annual per capita income of two-thirds of the economically 
active rural population down to the tiny sum of 275 dollars. 
In recent years, the growth rate of the agricultural sector has 
shown signs of quickening. However, in many countries it has not done so 
sufficiently to satisfy domestic demand, although this has been increasing 
very slowly on a par with income, and the inflexibility of agricultural 
production has often created inflationary tensions that have reduced real 
wages. Moreover, opportunities of developing certain exports have been 
lost, and it is necessary to import large quantities of agricultural 





Because of its very nature and magnitude, tfte economic and social 
problem of agriculture is a built-in and significant part of the problem 
of Latin American development as a whole® Its fundamental causes are 
well-known: the land tenure system, technological backwardness, low 
productivity and the small volume of investment« The land reform programmes-
launched in various countries are meeting with serious obstacles and 
opposition of different kinds« More far-reaching, generalized and prompt 
action must be taken to sweep these obstacles away, since only in this way 
can rural income be raised and its distribution improved, and the national 
economies fired with greater dynamism* 
(e) . Import-saving industrialization 
The industrial growth that has been taking place in Latin America 
has provided the impetus for development in the last ten or fifteen years • 
and has played a decisive part in shaping the economic and social structure 
of the Latin American countries. Much has been gained in the way of 
experience, knowledge and industrial skills, and it is clear that these 
countries now have a much sounder foundation on which to build a more 
efficient economic and social development policy» This must be recognized 
even though the process of industrial development may be attacked from 
every angle, and these attacks may, in fact, be justified, since it has 
obvious defects which are obstructing the future development of the 
Latin American economies» 
Indiscriminate import substitution under the shelter of much too 
high tariff walls has led to an extensive industrialization which, at its 
present stage, is characterized by a distorted structure of production 
that is both costly and inefficient in some vital aspects» Efforts have 
been made to produce the goods that are most profitable from the 
standpoint of the national or foreign private entrepreneur in the light 
of market requirements» Durable consumer goods industries have thus been 
developed, in the more advanced countries in particular, instead of 
strengthening strategic development activities such as steelmaking, and 
the chemical, petrochemical and machinery and equipment industries» The 
establishment of a large number of plants of unsuitable sizes has meant 
a squandering of capital and low productivity» Where economies of scale could 
be meaningful, they have not been achieved, and much of the capacity is 
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imder--utilized# Lack of specialization in industrial plants helps to 
keep costs' up. Traditional family-type management is another barrier 
to the modernization of enterprises. Their technical shortcomings have 
thus been compounded with financial weakness, particularly in the 
inflation-ridden countries. These, then, -are the factors that partly 
explain why more and more Latin American firms are passing into foreign 
hands. 
This type of industrial structure has been determined by the lack 
of an industrial policy with clear-cut development goals, and by production 
purely for national markets. It will be no easy task to rectify this 
structure and gradually introduce a climate of competition into Latin 
American industry that will lead to greater efficiency in the use of the 
resources and production capacity available. This may be done much more 
easily if a fresh impetus is given to industrial development, which seems 
to have been flagging in the last few years. In a development strategy, 
two things are clearly essential: to strengthen national markets and to 
make industry export-oriented. The absorption of surplus labour in 
productive activities, a policy of income redistribution and a programme 
of land reform will immediately help to do the former. Integration and 
the sale of industrial goods outside the region will bring with them the 
advantages of a broader market and the incentives for continuing the 
process of industrialization in a more efficient way. 
(f) Inflation and its consequences 
Inflationary pressures, with the resulting disruptions, persist in 
many countries of the region, slowing down Latin American development and 
limiting its social scope. 
This is not the place to examine the immediate or indirect causes 
of inflation or to go into its many consequences, but it is useful to recall 
its obvious links with the problems analysed above, both because they 
help to set off the inflationary spiral, and because they are aggravated 
by it and obstruct its cure» 
It must not be concluded from this vicious circle that until 
certain structural features or deficiencies are remedied no steps can be 
taken to curb or control inflationary pressures. This is borne out to some 





I n f l a t i o n i s a s e r i o u s s t u m b l i n g - b l o c k prevent ing c o u n t r i e s from 
framing and m a i n t a i n i n g economic development p o l i c i e s or d e c i s i o n s . There 
i s no doubt t h a t an i n f l a t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n checks and hampers any important 
or f a r - r e a c h i n g d e c i s i o n t h a t should be adopted on such v i t a l mat ters q s 
income and p r i c e s , exchange r a t e s , and p u b l i c income and e x p e n d i t u r e . 
These a r e among t h e most c o s t l y - and not a lways p r o p e r l y a p p r e c i a t e d 
a p p r e c i a t e d - e f f e c t s of i n f l a t i o n , and t h e y have had c o n s i d e r a b l e i n f l u e n c e 
on t h e s l u g g i s h and i r r e g u l a r development of some c o u n t r i e s , 
(g ) Externa l s t r u c t u r a l f a c t o r s 
The o r i g i n and nature o f t h e e x t e r n a l b o t t l e n e c k i n t h e L a t i n 
American c o u n t r i e s , and t h e way i t makes t h e development p r o c e s s undynamic 
and v u l n e r a b l e , a r e w e l l known. A p o l i c y c e n t r e d l a r g e l y on import 
s u b s t i t u t i o n , and t h e want o f e f f e c t i v e measures t o make t h e n e c e s s a r y 
adjus tments t o produce a s t r u c t u r e o f economic growth t h a t would be 
geared t o t h e more dynamic i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a d e a c t i v i t i e s , keep t h e s e 
c o u n t r i e s dependent on primary commodities and t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l markets , 
w i t h a l l t h e l i m i t a t i o n s and i n s t a b i l i t y t h a t t&is i m p l i e s . 
For reasons which a r e o n l y t o o w e l l known, import s u b s t i t u t i o n has 
f a i l e d t o remedy t h e chronic d e f i c i t i n t h e b a l a n c e of payments and has 
e s t a b l i s h e d e x t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s t h a t a r e ex tremely i n e l a s t i c i n t h a t 
imports have been c o n f i n e d t o e s s e n t i a l i n t e r m e d i a t e goods and c a p i t a l 
goods , a l t h o u g h more f l e x i b l e c o n d i t i o n s do e x i s t , e s p e c i a l l y i n t h e 
c o u n t r i e s t h a t have made l e a s t p r o g r e s s w i t h import s u b s t i t u t i o n . E x t e r n a l 
borrowing, t h e o t h e r remfedy t h a t h a s been t r i e d , has made t h e s i t u a t i o n 
even more i n f l e x i b l e and has i n c r e a s e d the v u l n e r a b i l i t y and dependence 
o f t h e L a t i n American economies because o f t h e tremendous burden p l a c e d 
on them by debt and inves tment s e r v i c i n g and t h e c l o s e connexion t h a t 
has been e s t a b l i s h e d between t h e growth r a t e and e x t e r n a l i n d e b t n e s s . 
Things have now come t o such a p a s s t h a t , i f t h e i r e x t e r n a l c a p i t a l i n f l o w 
were t o d i m i n i s h , many c o u n t r i e s would be f a c e d w i t h an i n s o l u b l e problem, 
s i n c e , i n order t o s e r v i c e t h e i r e x t e r n a l d e b t s and i n v e s t m e n t , t h e y 
would have t o s l a s h imports t o an i m p o s s i b l y low l e v e l . 
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Although export income has been growing more vigorously in recent 
years, notworthy in this respect being the growth of manufactured exports, 
in particular in Brazil, the external bottleneck is still very much in 
evidence» It is all too well known that the economic growth rate of many 
countries would have been much higher, even with current policies, if 
there had been no such obstacle* This is confirmed by the improvement in 
the growth rate achieved or about to be achieved by those countries which 
have had fewer external difficulties to grapple with, and by the immediate 
response of the growth rate in every country when there is an expansion 
of exports or of external purchasing power, except when stabilization 
policies are being applied. 
It may not be out of place to go further into another aspect of 
the influence of the external bottleneck on economic trends, namely, its 
repercussions on the mobilization of domestic savings. When the potential 
trade gap is greater than the potential domestic savings gap and a 
country has to borrow to cover its balance-of-payments deficit, it is 
highly probable, as latin American experience has so often demonstrated, 
that the economy will eventually adapt itself by creating idle capacity 
or reducing the domestic saving coefficient. In both cases, domestic 
resources are squandered and future development is undermined by the 
burden of debt servicing. Adaptations of this kind are even more undesirable 
when the relative increase in consumption takes place, as it is most 
likely to do, in response to the pressure of demand from the high-income 
groups, thus accentuating the concentration of resources in the production 
of certain lines of durable consumer goods and widening the consumption 
gap.between those groups and the lower income strata. The results are 
similar when the potential savings gap is closed by external loans, even 
if the export and import situation happens to be more favourable. This 
does not mean that external contributions are unnecessary or necessarily 
harmful. What must be made clear is that an effective policy is needed 
to ensure that any such resources fulfil their true purpose of facilitating 
the mobilization of domestic resources for productive ends, and that the 
only sound and lasting remedy for the external bottleneck is essentially 
to develop exports. 
/(h) The 
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(h) The l a c k o f an e f f e c t i v e f o r e i g n t r a d e p o l i c y 
Lat in America has never had a v igorous f o r e i g n t r a d e p o l i c y 
r e f l e c t i n g a c l e a r c o n c e p t i o n o f r e g i o n a l development . Confronted w i t h 
ba lance -o f -payments problems, t h e r e g i o n has r e s o r t e d t o t h e e a s i e s t and 
most immediate s o l u t i o n s , namely, borrowing and import s u b s t i t u t i o n , which 
have ended by aggravat ing t h e problems t h e m s e l v e s . For want o f such a 
c o n c e p t i o n , t r a d e p o l i c y has been i n s t r u m e n t a l i n de termin ing an i n t e r n a l 
s t r u c t u r e and a l e v e l o f e f f i c i e n c y t h a t a r e impeding t h e f u r t h e r 
development o f the l a t i n American economies . I t i s obv ious from i t s 
a c t i o n i n t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l sphere t h a t l a t i n America has not been 
s t rong enough t o f o r e s t a l l o r i n f l u e n c e t h e a d o p t i o n of d e c i s i o n s t h a t 
have proved i n c r e a s i n g l y p r e j u d i c i a l t o i t s i n t e r e s t s , and t h a t i t 
h a s f a i l e d t o a c t w i t h t h e r a p i d i t y and v i s i o n n e c e s s a r y t o a d j u s t t o 
t h e changes t h a t have been t a k i n g ( place i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a d e a s a 
r e s u l t o f t h e economic and t e c h n o l o g i c a l p r o g r e s s o f t h e i n d u s t r i a l c e n t r e s . 
The i n d u s t r i a l c o u n t r i e s have deve loped t h e i r t r a d e t o a 
remarkable e x t e n t by i n c o r p o r a t i n g t h e new products c r e a t e d by t h e 
unceas ing advance of t e c h n o l o g y , and t h i s h e l p s them t o d i v e r s i f y t h e i r 
p a t t e r n s of consumption. Such t r a d e has been a f a c t o r o f paramount 
importance i n t h e i r economic growth. S t r a n g e l y enough, t h i s t rend o f 
development has been accompanied by an upsurge i n t h e i r produc t ion of 
major primary commodit ies , w i t h t h e r e s u l t t h a t t h e y have o u s t e d l a t i n 
America from i t s t r a d i t i o n a l markets and p l a c e d d i f f i c u l t i e s i n t h e way 
o f i t s e n t e r i n g o t h e r a r e a s . In vary ing d e g r e e s but t o an e v e r - i n c r e a s i n g 
e x t e n t , t h e i n d u s t r i a l c o u n t r i e s have now become major e x p o r t e r s o f primary 
commodit ies . This i s very l a r g e l y t h e consequence o f a h i g h l y 
p r o t e c t i o n i s t p o l i c y , o f t e c h n o l o g i c a l advances i n methods o f a g r i c u l t u r a l 
product ion which have l e d t o a s p e c t a c u l a r i n c r e a s e i n t h e product ( s i d e 
by s i d e w i t h a d e c l i n e i n t h e e c o n o m i c a l l y a c t i v e p o p u l a t i o n i n r u r a l 
a r e a s ) and i n t h o s e c o u n t r i e s 1 power t o f i n a n c e more c o s t l y e x p o r t s . 
The e v o l u t i o n o f t h e Lat in American economies has been e n t i r e l y 
d i f f e r e n t . Great s t r i d e s have been made i n i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n , a l t h o u g h 
t o d i f f e r e n t d e g r e e s i n t h e l a r g e , medium and s m a l l c o u n t r i e s ; but t h e 
ensu ing changes i n t h e i n t e r n a l s t r u c t u r e o f product ion and improvement 
/in the 
E/ CN .12/836/Rev. 1 
Page 19 
in the management of the econonçr have had virtually no effect on exports. 
Under the pressure of the economic policy of the major centres, the 
technological innovations that herald new substitute products, and the 
low elasticity of demand, exports still consist in the main of primary 
commodities. In their foreign trade, the Latin American countries, 
even those with the most advanced industrial sector, perpetuate the 
traditional pattern of the international division of labour, of which 
they have to bear the unhappy consequences. 
These countries have preserved their ties with the traditional 
centres in an attempt at self-defence that has ultimately proved 
unfruitful for them. Owing to lack of vision or difficulties of other 
kinds, they have failed to diversify their commodity markets. They have 
not reacted promptly to the changing conditions of international trade 
which would undoubtedly require a more efficient and competitive type 
of industrialisation. It is a well-known fact that the measures they 
might have taken to escape from this situation were severely curtailed 
by a certain group of interests. It is equally certain, however, that 
they have taken an isolated stance in their foreign trade in defence 
of a position that has gradually been undermined, and have failed to 





3. Prospects and possibilities for economic 
development in the 1970s 3/-' 
An analysis of projections of the prospects for economic growth 
will help to give a more comprehensive picture of some of the important 
points raised in the preceding section relating to the basic causes of 
the economic and social backwardness of the region, and to provide 
criteria on the basis of which the nature of the problems and the basic 
objectives of development policy and strategy can be defined more precisely. 
Ihe projections cover four fundamental components of the growth rate: 
(a) population trends; (b) the mobilization of domestic resources, with 
special emphasis on savings; (c) external trade requirements; and 
(d) external financing.• ( 
(a) Population trends and projections 
The population of Latin America has been growing at an amazing 
speed over the last fifty years. Its annual growth rate, which was only 
1.8 per cent at the beginning of the century, has now risen to 2.88 per cent. 
If this rate continues, the population will increase by 95 million to a 
total of 379 million for the region as a whole by the end of the 1970s. 
The factors underlying this, population growth are the development of health 
care, and medical discoveries,, which have reduced mortality, in combination 
with a birth rate that has remained relatively high. 
Population growth is far from uniform in all the Latin American 
countries. In some, such as Argentina and Uruguay, growth is slow, and 
the urban population very large. In others, like Bolivia and Haiti, 
with lower income levels, high mortality is still keeping growth down. 
But in the majority of the countries, which account for more than 80 per cent 
of the total population, the population increase is over 3 per cent 
annually, and the rural population constitutes more than 40 per cent of 
the total for these countries. 





This population trend is very important for development policy and 
has its own special characteristics in Latin America. If the region is 
considered as a whole, it will be seen that average population density is 
low, that the ratio of population to resources is rather better than in 
other areas, and, what is highly significant, that the geographical 
distribution of the population is extremely uneven. Major urban centres and 
certain rural areas are heavily populated, while vast tracts of land in the 
interior are almost uninhabited. 
It is only in two of these.countries, which achieved a relatively 
high income level a long time ago, that the process of urbanization has 
been accompanied by a reduction in the birth rate. This has also started 
in Cuba and Chile. 
Elsewhere the population is growing even more rapidly despite 
intensive urbanization in the last twenty years. This can be attributed 
to the large numbers of people living in rural areas, where the birth 
rate is higher, and to the failure of migrants to the towns to adapt 
themselves in any real sense to the living conditions, customs and habits 
of the urban population. It is also due to the fact that the people's 
knowledge of and ability to obtain the means of birth control are limited 
by the lack of information and financial resources. Moreover, it is unlikely 
that the process of urbanization will influence the birth rate quite so 
quickly, relatively speaking as mortality has been reduced. 
There are, however, unmistakable signs that population development 
will be passing through a transition period in the next decade. Trends 
in recent years and an analysis of projections to 1985 point to the 
following conclusions: (a) the growth rate of the population has been 
increasing at a slower pace in the last thirty years; from 2.37 in the 
1940s it rose to 2.80 in the 1950s and to no more than 2.88 in the 1960s; 
(b) the projection of current trends indicates that the growth rate will 
not be more than 3 per cent in the next decade; (c) if these trends are 
assessed in relation to factors that may reduce the birth rate, the lowest 




the next fifteen years. If, on the other hand, birth rates remain high, 
the steady drop in the death rate will mean that the population will grow 
at a higher rate -3*1 or 3*2 per cent - during that period.̂ / 
In short, it appears that: (a) the trend of the economically active, 
population during the next decade has already been determined and will be 
unaffected by the course of the birth rate in the next few years; the 
population will tend to grow rather more than before, at an over-all rate 
of 3 per cent for the region and of 3»5 per cent or even more in many 
countries; (b) the proportion of growing children and children of school 
age (up to fifteen years old) may vary with the birth rate, although the 
anticipated decline in mortality will play an important part in offsetting 
any reduction that may take place; it is only if the birth rate grows at 
the lowest possible rate in accordance with the most extreme hypothesis, 
that there will be a decrease of any appreciable size in this population* 
group compared with the present trend; and (c) the growth rate of the 
total population may rise in those countries where mortality is still 
relatively high. 
It is still too early to predict what effect the spread of birth 
control may have on the trend of natality during the next ten years, 
and possibly the 1980s as well. So far, there have been indications of a 
policy of birth control only in a few isolated cases, but in at least one 
country - Argentina - a definite policy of population expansion has been 
officially decided upon. However, it appears that, in any case, population 
rates will range between a minimum of 2.7 to 2,8 per cent and a maximum of 
3.1 to 3#2 per cent, with substantial variations from country to country, 
(b) The potential domestic savings gap 
Toohxd-cal studies o f eighteen latin American countries show t h a t , 
despite the high concentration of income in certain strata, not enough 
savings are being generated to raise the current economic growth rate to 
4/ See ECLA, Social change and social development policy in Latin 
~ America, (United Nations publication, Sales N°: E,70.II«Cr,3) and 





any s i g n i f i c a n t e x t e n t . ^ Unfor tunate ly , an a n a l y s i s o f t h i s kind 
i n e v i t a b l y has s e r i o u s l i m i t a t i o n s , s i n c e no s t u d i e s e x i s t s towing the 
sources o f s a v i n g s , t h e i r movements and s h i f t s , and t h e i r u s e s i n Lat in 
America. Hence, any a n a l y s i s has t o be based on the s a v i n g s t h a t 
e v e n t u a l l y become inves tment c a p i t a l . N e v e r t h e l e s s , d e s p i t e t h e s e 
l i m i t a t i o n s , i t i s u s e f u l t o d i s c u s s t h i s t o p i c because o f i t s important 
i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r development p o l i c y . 
I t might be e x p e c t e d t h a t a s income i n c r e a s e d , the s a v i n g s c o e f f i c i e n t 
would r i s e and thus speed up the r a t e o f c a p i t a l format ion , but t h i s d o e s not 
appear t o be the case i n Lat in America. I t i s c l e a r t h a t the e x t e r n a l 
b o t t l e n e c k , a s a r e s u l t of a number of f a c t o r s , makes i t d i f f i c u l t t o use 
domestic s a v i n g s p r o d u c t i v e l y , but o t h e r components of t h e economic and 
s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e are a l s o r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h i s phenomenon. Recent exper ience 
i n Lat in America i n c l u d e s c a s e s i n which a r e l a t i v e l y h i g h growth r a t e , 
s t imula ted by e x t e r n a l f i n a n c i n g , has r e s u l t e d i n an i n c r e a s e i n inves tment 
and i n t h e domest ic s a v i n g s c o e f f i c i e n t . These r e l a t i o n s h i p s favour 
development, s i n c e t h e e x t e r n a l d e b t then has the e f f e c t o f s t r e n g t h e n i n g 
product ive c a p a c i t y and of i n c r e a s i n g the m o b i l i z a t i o n o f domestic 
r e s o u r c e s , which, i n turn l e a d s t o a s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g growth r a t e . This 
i s t h e e x c e p t i o n t o the r u l e , however, and i n many c o u n t r i e s t h i s p r o c e s s 
has n o t l e d t o any s i g n i f i c a n t r i s e i n the s a v i n g s c o e f f i c i e n t . 
Therefore because o f e x t e r n a l f a c t o r s , t h e consumption p a t t e r n 
of the h igh income groups , or the extremely low income l e v e l o f the v a s t 
mass o f the p o p u l a t i o n , two f a c t s s tand out a s be ing s i g n i f i c a n t f o r 
fu ture economic development. F i r s t , t h e sav ings - inves tment proces s d o e s 
not have the f l e x i b i l i t y i n Lat in America t h a t i t has i n t h e i n d u s t r i a l i z e d 
c o u n t r i e s ; and, s e c o n d l y , i t cannot be s a i d t h a t the p r o c e s s i s s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g 
i n the sense t h a t an i n c r e a s e i n income, even i f the r e s u l t of e x t e r n a l 
f i n a n c i n g , a u t o m a t i c a l l y l e a d s t o i n c r e a s e s i n the s a v i n g s c o e f f i c i e n t , 
ï h i s depends on s t r u c t u r a l changes and on d e l i b e r a t e a c t i o n r a t t e r than 
on the f r e e i n t e r p l a y o f the v a r i a b l e s i n v o l v e d . 
y See document E/CN.12/865, op.cit. 
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In the study analysing growth rates and savings trends in a group of 
eighteen countries two hypotheses are examined. One assumes a target growth 
rate of the product following past trends, although distributed among countries, 
and gives an over-all annual growth rate for the group of 5*5 per cent. The 
other assumes an accelerated growth rate generally rising in a l l countries 
to an annual figure of 7 per cent in the period 1975-1980, The average 
annual growth rate of the countries as a group over the period 1970-1980 
is placed at 7.1 per cent. 
The analysis shows that i f the ratio of ex post saving to national 
income follows past trends, under the low growth hypothesis (5.5 per cent) 
fourteen of the countries can be expected to have a savings gap in 1975 
(see tables 20 and 21 of document E/CN.12/865). These potential savings 
gaps are quite considerable in some cases, and in seven countries represent 
more than 20 per cent of gross investment. By 1980, thirteen countries are 
expected to have a savings gap, which means that only one country would 
have improved i t s position. 
Under the accelerated growth hypothesis (an average of 7 .1 per cent), 
a l l eighteen countries can be expected to have a savings gap that w i l l 
gradually widen during the decade and would amount in total to over 
10,000 million dollars in 1975* This amount i s equal to the amount of net 
external financing that w i l l probably be needed to sustain the growth rate 
targets. The seriousness of the problem stemming from these potential 
savings gaps i s evident i f . i t i s remembered that the maximum amount of 
external financing received by the region as a whole has not exceeded 
2,000 million dollars in recent years. It should be noted that the 
estimates refer to ex post saving, since they are based on investment trends 
and do not measure the amount of savings that may actually be generated in 
these countries* Hence, in some cases they may exaggerate the true size 
of the potential savings gap. 
Nevertheless, irrespective of the e f fec t of these disparities and 
of the technical limitations of. the figures, these estimates do give an 
idea of the huge problem involved in mobilizing domestic resources to 
speed up economic growth, 
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In many cases the potential savings gap i s greater than the balance-
of-payments de f i c i t resulting from the trade gap, as w i l l be seen in a later 
section» Moreover, the gaps m y be more pronounced in the i n i t i a l stages of 
speeding up the growth rate., If in these hypothetical circumstances the 
savings gap were to be covered by external financing in order to attain 
the growth target f ixed, the economy would adjust i t s e l f , and imports 
might be stimulated over and above anticipated requirements. Moreover, i t 
i s most l ikely that there would be an increase in imports of luxury or 
non-essential consumer goods or the imports would take the place of goods which 
might be domestically produced. In addition, a policy of this kind would tend 
to act as a disincentive to export expansion programmes. 
This analysis i s more than a mere academic exercise, A careful 
examination of trends in several countries of the region would show cases 
in which restricting the potential growth rate has more e f fec t on domestic 
than on external factors. Moreover, at least part of the external financing 
used i s needed,. not because of a lack of capacity to import, but because of 
the lack of savings for investment. In such cases the external debt functions 
more as a substitute for domestic saving than as an essential complement to i t . 
Itoo variables must be considered in order to assess the poss ib i l i t i e s 
of reducing the potential savings gap: one i s the capital-output ratio, 
which determines the amount of investment, and the other i s the ratio of 
savings to income, which provides the bulk of the resources for domestic 
financing. The f i r s t point to be considered i s the poss ibi l i ty of reducing 
investment needs by raising the capital-output rat io . 
Much i s to be gained by making more e f f i c i e n t use of capital , and 
this should become a basic objective of development policy. There i s 
idle capacity in several branches of industry; productivity and production in 
the agricultural sector can be increased considerably without any heavy 
capital investment; a well-designed policy for investment and the replacement 
of machinery, and the adoption of technologies more in l ine with the 
lat in American productive process and environment, are other general points 
which show the great potential for increased ef f ic iency . In addition, a 
change in the productive structure could save capital , while the new economic 
and social environment established by development policy would encourage the 
/direct employment 
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direct employment of labour in rural and urban areas in capital-saving 
construction and public works of various kinds for the infrastructure* 
Nevertheless, these savings, however large, wi l l probably not be 
enough to o f f se t the relat ively greater increase in the amount of 
investment required to speed up economic growth and social development. 
The infrastructure,must be expanded in such f i e lds as energy, transport 
and communications, which have long lead times and low capital-output ratios* 
The same i s true for housing construction and the expansion of public 
services. It must also be remembered that producing essential intermediate 
goods and capital goods requires modern methods of production and comparatively 
more capital . Hence, i t nay well be that the current aggregate capital-output 
ratio will remain the same or even rise over the long term, given a different 
and more e f f i c i en t structure. 
Furthermore, i f the capital-output ratio for the economy as a whole 
i s lowered,.this should not be taken as a sign that there i s l e s s need 
for savings,, but as evidence that the rate of growth can be speeded up 
even further, in "which case, as i s clear from the projections, there would 
again be a sayings gap. 
In brief , in terms of the savings gap, the possibi l i ty of speeding 
up the growth rate depends on the eff ic iency with which capital i s 
allocated and used, the comprehensiveness of inst itutional reform, and the 
effectiveness of the pol icies required to increase the amount of investment 
capital. A, relat ively large increase is . needed in the investment coef f ic ient , 
in order to change matters. For example, the gross investment coef f ic ient , 
which now stands at around 18 per cent for the region as a whole, would 
have to r ise to 24 per cent to sustain an annual growth rate of 7 per cent. 
In no case can i t be expected that th is increase would be financed by 
external borrowing. Quite apart from the feas ib i l i ty or rationality of 
such a course, suff ice it, to recal l that, even in the years when i t was at 
i t s maximum, net external financing was never as much as 2 per cent of the 
product. In the f i n a l analysis, speeding up economic and social development 
w i l l require restraints on the growth of personal consumption, at least in 
/ the i n i t i a l 
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the. i n i t i a l stages, the brunt of which w i l l be borne by the high-income 
groups. Hence, the poss ib i l i ty of s igni f icant ly rais ing the growth 
rate depends upon the f e a s i b i l i t y and comprehensiveness of the pol ic ies 
adopted. 
(c) The potential trade and balance-of-payments Raps 
The other basic factor to be considered in th i s evaluation of the 
projected growth rate relates to foreign trade needs and, in particular, 
the economy's a b i l i t y to finance the minimum amount of imports required 
to attain spec i f ic growth targets . This analysis i s therefore based on 
three main variables: projected exports, import requirements and service 
payments on the external debt arid foreign investment. In broad outl ine, 
the study of the group of eighteen countries shows that , under present 
conditions, unless there are substantial changes in world economic and 
trade policy, or active export promotion programmes are carried out at 
the national l e v e l , or there i s progress in integration, current foreign 
exchange receipts w i l l increase much more slowly than imports, resulting 
in sizable potential d e f i c i t s in relat ion to the accelerated growth target. 
The situation looks even blacker when the interest and returns on the debt 
and foreign investment are considered, because of the s ize of the potential 
balance-of-payments gaps. The 120st striking conclusions drawn from the 
technical analysis undertaken are given below. 
Under exist ing conditions, and in order to i l l u s t r a t e the nature . 
and scope of the external problems hampering Latin American development, 
i t was thought appropriate to examine, the implications of three hypotheses 
regarding exports: a low growth rate, an intermediate growth rate and a 
re lat ive ly high growth rate. 
These three hypotheses give average annual growth rates for the region 
as a whole of 4 .5 , 5*4 and 6.3 por cent respectively, compared with the 
average recorded in the period 1966-1968» Table 17 of document E/CN.12/865 




Separate analyses were made for each country of the volume of exports 
and of prices for major exports; account was taken of past trends, the 
probable e f fec t qf current export promotion policy and, partly at l eas t , the 
most recent results of integration, particularly in the Central American 
area. These were the basic criteria, for formulating the low and intermediate 
hypotheses» The intermediate hypothesis assumes more favourable growth 
rates for traditional exports and better results from export promotion policy. 
The high hypothesis must be interpreted as a desirable alternative that wi l l 
require more profound policy changes and more propitions domestic and 
external conditions than at present. The growth rates under this hypothesis 
were determined by adding 1*5 percentage points to annual growth rates under 
the intermediate hypothesis. 
These hypotheses assume that exports va i l expand relatively rapidly 
in comparison with past trends, for over the past twenty years the real 
value of exports in terms of purchasing power grew at an average annual rate 
of s l ightly over 3 per cent. It i s only the recent upsurge that has raised 
the rate for the 1960s to 3.9 per cent; over the past three years, the 
purchasing power of exports,has grown at an average annual rate of 6.4 per 
cent. 
It was noted above that, in order to determine the potential trade and 
balance-of-payments gaps, i t i s necessary to project import needs in relation 
to the growth targets. The projections were calculated on the basis of past 
trends in the ratios between the product,. investment and imports. Under the 
low growth rate hypothesis (5»5 per cent), imports by the region as a whole 
w i l l have to increase by between 3*9 and 4#4 per cent each year, starting 
from the average levels achieved in 1966-1968; while under the accelerated 
growth rate hypothesis (an average of 7*1 per cent during the 1970s), import 
needs would tend to expand very rapidly and imports would be expected to 
grow by an average of 7.5 per cent annually up to 1975 and by 6.2 per cent 
during the second half of the decade. —̂  
6/ See document E/CN,12/865, o p . c i t , , tables F and G, 
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These figures are a good i l lustrat ion of the e f fec t on the balance 
of payment of speeding up the process of economic growth, the main component 
being the high import content of investment which has to grow very rapidly 
in order to make i t possible to speed up the growth rate, even with the 
import substitution process continuing. It should be noted that for many 
countries these projections of imports should be regarded as minimum 
requirements, for the estimates assume that import substitution wi l l continue 
at the same pace as in the past, something that does not seem l ike ly unless 
there i s more rapid progress in integration«. 
The above figures provide a basis for examining the balance of trade 
and payments prospects of the Latin American countries. 
In order to.s implify matters and to give prominence to the most 
important aspects, the following paragraphs w i l l refer only to the balance-
of-payments situation under the accelerated growth hypothesis in comparison 
with the intermediate and high hypotheses for the growth of exports. 
Taking f i r s t the projections under the intermediate hypothesis for 
the growth of exports, i t appears that by 1975 f i f t e e n of the eighteen 
countries w i l l have a potential trade gap total l ing close to 2,270 million 
dollars and that by 1980 a l l eighteen wi l l have a trade gap total l ing 
some 4>600 million dollars. The balance-of-payments de f i c i t i s considerably 
greater i f account i s taken of payment in respect of interest , profits and 
foreign investrqent. If these factors are calculated in accordance with 
present trends and i t i s assumed that financing for a l l the cumulative 
potential trade gap shown by the projections wi l l be drawn from the various 
sources in proportions similar to those currently recorded, then by 1975 
the total potential balance-of-payment de f i c i t for the f i f t een countries 
7/ 
would attain the high l eve l of 5,900 million dollars. ~ 
Under the accelerated economic growth hypothesis and the high 
hypothesis for the growth of exports, the picture changes considerably. 
By 1975, thirteen countries would have a potential trade gap, but th i s 
7 / See table 23 of document E/CW.12/865 which gives the figures for 1980 
and indicates which countries are expected to record a trade balance 
surplus, /would to ta l 
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would total only 1,500 million dollars,.while by 1980 fourteen countries 
would have a trade gap total l ing some 2,500 million dollars. In th i s case, 
too, the figures would be higher i f account i s taken of the corresponding 
payment of interest and profits . 
These appreciable differences in the potential trade gap are 
i l lustrat ive of the great influence of variations in exports on the capacity 
of the economy to increase i t s rate of growths In other words, the most 
favourable growth hypothesis for exports promises more rapid over-all 
economic growth. It must now be determined what are the main poss ib i l i t i e s 
that would reduce such gaps to tolerable proportions. In principle, there 
are three points on which to work: imports, exports and servicing. 
It does not seem feasible , in principle, to lower the import coeff ic ient 
s t i l l further, and thus reduce foreign exchange needs, particularly i f 
import substitution continues to be confined to domestic markets, not on 
account of technical d i f f i c u l t i e s but because of the greater economic 
eff ic iency required in each country's industrial development. Obviously, 
fa ir ly extensive saving i s possible in respect of imports, especially of 
goods and inputs which are directly or indirectly destined for luxury or 
deferrable consumption and which in one way or another contribute to the 
potential gap projected on the basis of past trends. It would be 
impracticable, however, to curb imports of essential intermediate products 
or capital goods, particularly in the f i r s t stage of speeding up economic 
act iv i ty . Moreover, situation might well arise where i t was necessaiy to 
increase external supplies of popular consumer goods over and above those 
projected. These limitations of import substitutions are much more severe 
in the case of the small and medium?-sized countries of the region. 
The expansion of exports clearly represents the soundest and most 
ef fect ive solution. The projections show the considerable importance of 
the growth of exports in reducing the potential gap, because of i t s e f fec t s 
on the trade balance and servicing. With a larger volume of exports i t may 
be expected that the growth rate wi l l be higher and that conditions fpr a 
more e f f i c i ent industrial policy may be established. In this respect, 
external financing i s not an alternative to the expansion of exports. The 
/ la t ter i s 
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l a t t er i s an essential objective and the former a supplementary and temporary-
recourse. The poss ib i l i t i e s of increasing export earnings depend on the 
specif ic results that may be obtained from international action i n the f i e l d 
of primary products, and on the abi l i ty of the Latin American countries to 
break into world trade in manufactures. Regional integration once again 
emerges as one of the fundamental instruments of national development 
because of the immediate contribution i t can make towards bridging the tr&de 
gap and achieving more rational structure of the Latin American economies, 
by enabling import substitution to continue in a broader market and exports 
to expand through reciprocal trade, 
(d) Future trends of structural unemployment 
This analysis should be rounded off by a few words on the future trend 
of structural unemployment, which has reached such alarming proportions 
that i t must be a key issue in every development strategy. There are obvious 
signs that the population trend wi l l enter a transition stage in the 1970a,. 
but that the labour force w i l l be increasing more rapidly than in the 1960s. 
It i s estimated that the annual groitfth rate of the economically active 
population in the region as a whole w i l l r ise from 2.8 per cent to 3 per 
cent. In a large number of small countries this rate w i l l be as high 
as 3.5 per cent, and only in Argentina and Uruguay wi l l the growth of the 
labour force be relat ively small. 
Hence, i f the rate of economic growth continues to be the same as in 
the past, the problem of structural unemployment wi l l become even more 
acute and wi l l assume extremely serious proportions because of i t s social 
repercussions. According to s ta t i s t i ca l estimates for the region as a 
whole, employment has grown more slowly than the active population; 
consequently, open unemployment has gradually increased, while at the same 
time the problems of underemployment and employment in unproductive 
ac t iv i t i e s have become more acute. Underemployment and unproductive 
employment are generally at least as serious as open unemployment, i f not 
more so. In a l l probability, 40 per cent of the total labour force i s 
underemployed, employed in a c t i v i t i e s with minimal productivity, overtly 
unemployed, or employed in services, which may be regarded as unproductive 
/ a c t i v i t i e s . It 
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ac t iv i t i e s . It i s estimated tint open unemployment alone represents about 
10 per cent of the economically active population. Since during the 1970s 
the active population i s expected to increase by 3 per cent annually, i f 
employment continues to grow at no more than i t s present rate of 2,6 per 
cent annually, open unemployment i s bound to double by 1980, -when i t w i l l 
represent more than 14 per cent of the active population. And the situation 
wi l l tend to get worse as the ratio of the supply of labour to the active 
population increases. This gap between the labour force and actual demand 
wi l l continue to widen. Moreover, i f domestic production retains i t s present 
growth rate of s l ight ly • above 5 per cent, the situation with respect to 
unproductive employment and underemployment, which were not taken into account 
in the above figures, w i l l also worsen. 
If structural unemployment i s to be reduced, employment must grow 
much faster than the active population and the per capita product must also 
rise more rapidly than in the past. The f i r s t condition directly a f fec t s 
the use of redundant manpower, and the second i s an indication that th i s 
labour i s being productively absorbed. 
If employment were to increase by 3*5 per cent yearly, open unemployment -
which i s assumed to cover 10 per cent of the active population - would s t i l l 
represent over 5 per cent of the active population in 1980, and the 
proportion would come close to normal leve ls only.in the course of the 1980s, . 
In order to solve the other aspects of structural unemployment, i t would 
be necessary to step up the growth of the product per person employed. 
Assuming that productivity were to grow by at the rather slow pace of 3 per 
cent instead of at the present rate of 2,6 per cent, the over-all product, 
should increase by an average of 5,5 per cent over the whole decade. But, 
transforming and modernizing* the structure of production w i l l probably 
require a rate of 7 per . cent or more. 
On the other hand, i f unemployment were assumed to cover 15 per cent 
of the active population - which i s nearer to the actual situation in many 
countries - even i f employment grew by 4 per cent, open unemployment would 
have risen to more than 6 per cent by 1980, and the over-all product might 
reach an average growth rate of perhaps 7*5 per cent* 
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This i s a much more serious problem for those countries with higher 
open and disguised unemployment coef f ic ients whose population i s increasing 
by more than the average rate of 3 per cent yearly which was applied in the 
above calculations. In these cases, a much higher over-all growth rate would 
be required to reach the employment targets set . It i s perhaps unnecessary 
to note that these over-all figures simply provide an idea of orders of . 
magnitude. 
These rough projections i l lustrate the huge effort that must be made 
to tackle the structural unemployment problem, and state the great problem 
of Latin American development in unequivocal terms» On the one hand, 
there are the heavy limitations placed on economic growth by the potential 
savings and balance-of-payments gaps, and, on the other, there i s the urgent 
need to speed up such growth in order to find productive employment for a 
rapidly growing labour force and to eliminate the extensive structural 
unemployment that has accumulated. 
If present trends persist , that i s , i f nothing i s done to reduce the 
potential balance-of-payments gaps or to apply a policy that would 
radically a l ter the mobilization of f inancial and real domestic resources 
during the 1970s, unemployment w i l l increase and income distribution wi l l 
become even more uneven, thus adding to the vast numbers of people who are 
now l iv ing from hand to mouth. This wi l l happen even i f the Latin American 
economy continues to grow at i t s present tempo. The prospects may of 
course vary from country to country, since the problem of employment wi l l 
be l e s s cr i t i ca l in some, but in others i t w i l l be even more acute than the 
over-all figures for the region and for the years examined would suggest, 
(e) Basic conclusions to be drawn from the analysis of the projections 
The following conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of the 
projections described in the previous sections: (a) unless the necessary 
structural changes are made to mobilize investment resources on a larger 
scale, i t w i l l clearly be impossible to step up the present rate of growth, 
increase productive employment and improve income distribution; (b) a 
technically feasible growth target of 7 per cent for the regional done s t ic 
product in the 1970s would entai l radical changes in economic policy and 
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t:he production structure; (c) the restrictions that would have to be 
imposed on consumption in order to raise productive investment could apply 
only to consumption in the higher income groups; (d) the poss ib i l i t i e s 
of achieving a more dynamic rate for productive investment w i l l depend on 
the rapid growth of export income; (e) the expansion of regional trade 
through the integration processes now under way and other potential 
agreements offers immediate poss ib i l i t i e s of achieving the specified 
development objectives; ( f ) contributions of external resources are needed, 
especially to solve the problem of the potential external de f i c i t ; aid 
(g), external financial co-operation of this kind wi l l have to be provided 
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Chapter II 
THE OBJECTIVES OF THE STRATEGY AND THE MEANS 
- OF ATTAINING THEM 
General consideration of the objectives 
(a) General def init ion 
I t i s impossible to envisage a standard development strategy and 
policy for the Latin American countries. This cannot be done even for 
each of the traditional groups (large, medium-sized and small) into 
which the countries are generally divided for purposes of analysis, 
because there are considerable differences between the countries which 
they comprise. Nevertheless, just as structural development problems 
and obstacles have been identif ied as prevailing, in differing degrees, 
in the region, i t i s also possible to define essential features of 
development strategy which are fa i r ly broadly applicable, although their 
practical implementation would depend on the particular conditions in 
each country and on the decisions of their Governments, 
The main objectives that should be set for a Latin American 
development strategy are evident from the discussion in the preceding 
chapters. 
The f i r s t objective must obviously be to raise and speed up the 
growth rate so that i t r ises steadily and continuously. This objective, 
which i s of a quantitative and general nature, must be complemented by 
others that relate more directly to the nature and content of the 
development process. 
The second objective, therefore, i s to ensure a more equitable 
distribution of the benefits of increases in production. This presupposes 
sweeping changes in several f i e l d s , which include: (a) absorbing the 
unemployed, the underemployed and those whose employment i s real ly disguised 
unemployment into genuinely productive ac t iv i t i e s ; (b) disseminating 
technological progress in order to even out the imbalances characteristic 




passage of time. This involves not only reducing the differences between 
urban and rural productivity, which i s of key importance in many countries, 
but also correcting the imbalances within each of the sectors of economic 
act iv i ty that exhibit a markedly uneven absorption arid dissemination of 
technical know-how; (c) improving the distribution of resources among the 
nain regions in each country, in order to prevent economic act iv i ty and 
social progress from being concentrated in too few areas, to take f u l l 
advantage of the development potential inherent in some areas and thus 
to benefit their inhabitants, who have l i t t l e opportunity to move to more 
dynamic areas; (d) ensuring the functional and personal distribution of the 
income generated by the process of economic development so that each social 
group receives i t s fair share of the available goods and services, 
(b) Objectives for the external sector 
The strategy, however, must consist of more than mere changes in 
the intensity and content of internal development. Internal objectives 
must necessarily be related to objectives for the external sector. On 
the one hand, there are problems - as noted in the preceding chapter - that 
must be overcome i f the vulnerability and dependence of national development 
i s to be reduced or eliminated. On the other, in order to f u l f i l this 
objective i t i s of decisive importance to expand external trade substantially 
and to improve the terms of trade. 
Consequently, another basic objective of development strategy must 
be to reduce or eliminate the factors that make for dependence and 
vulnerability in the external sector and to establish a more favourable 
framework or system for trade and co-operation within Latin America 
i t s e l f and v is -¿-v is the rest of the world, especially the industrialized 
countries. Of obvious importance in this respect are such matters as the 
expansion and diversif ication of exports, regional integration and external 
finaneial co-operation. 
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(c) Consistency of the objectives 
I t might be thought that these objectives were interdependent and' 
that the speeding up of economic growth, for example, would suff ice to 
solve the employment problem, improve the distribution of income among 
the social strata and promote integration of the national economies. While 
there i s undoubtedly some interrelationship between a l l of these, their 
e f fec ts have not been rapid or far-reaching enough. Moreover, as has been 
seen in reviewing the internal obstacles to development, there are factors 
inherent in the structure of the Latin American economies which l imit the 
economic and social e f f ec t s of the evolution of those structures. What 
i s more, unless suitable strategy i s adopted, in tune with the conditions 
peculiar to each country, those objectives may confl ict with instead of 
supporting each other. This fact i s i l lustrated below. 
The productive absorption of redundant manpower and of the additions 
to the labour force deriving from population growth does not depend 
exclusively upon the rate of economic growth. Other v i ta l factors are 
the structure of that growth, the sectoral and regional allocation of 
investment, and production techniques in so far as the participation of 
capital and manpower i s concerned. Thus, the objective of raising 
productivity may be incompatible with that of increasing employment. An 
income redistribution policy which results in the expansion of total public 
and private consumption may slow down the ultimate rate of economic growth 
and create acute inflationary pressures unless proper attention has been 
paid to the formation of productive capacity or steps have been taken 
to correct the structural factors limiting production in speci f ic a c t i v i t i e s , 
such as agriculture. Likewise, the acceleration of the growth rate, l e f t 
to the free play of the forces implicit in the present economic structure, 
may merely accentuate regional disparities and the unequal distribution 
of income. Further, i t may so happen that deliberately chosen regional 
development aims are not compatible, in a given period, with the over-all 
objective of attaining maximum growth in that period. 
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In short, the problem that must now receive f \ i l l consideration in national 
planning i s that of achieving compatibility between these different 
essential objectives. Some aspects of th is subject are dealt with la ter , 
(d) Development policy and population 
Before discussing the basic economic and social objectives in deta i l , 
i t may be useful to relate them to a more general point examined in 
chapter I , namely, population growth. 
I t i s quite clear from chapter I that the basic, aspects of development 
strategy cannot be allowed to depend upon natal i ty trends in the 1970s» 
There i s no doubt, moreover, that the implementation of the fundamental 
changes and reforms necessary for development w i l l contribute to the 
process of population change which i s beginning to make i t s e l f f e l t in 
Latin America. This can, of course, be strengthened by measures spec i f ica l ly 
designed to give people knowledge about and the means of e f fect ive family 
planning. I t i s obvious, however, that i t must not be assumed that a 
reduction in the birth rate w i l l free resources and thus make the need 
for inst itutional reforms and the policies of mobilization envisaged 
rather l e s s pressing than at present, A reduction in the birth rate 
would, of course, improve the l iv ing leve ls and educational poss ib i l i t i e s 
of young people much more rapidly, and would also help to raise the 
average consumption level of the population as a whole; but the nature 
and magnitude of development problems in l a t in America are such that the 
urgently needed economic explosion must come, and i t cannot even be 
conditioned by the fact that the population explosion may taper off in 
the coming years. 
Now that the sal ient aspects have been brought out, i t may be useful 
to dwell further on some of the considerations expounded. I t i s obvious 
that the average level of per capita consumption could have been higher 
over the las t twenty years or so i f the birth rate had grown les s rapidly. 
A decline in the birth rate would to some extent make i t possible to 
achieve the essential objective of improving the l iving leve ls of the 
masses in a shorter space of time. This i s particularly important for 
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countries with a high rate of population growth. However, the situation 
varies so much from one part of Latin America to another that i t does not 
lend i t s e l f to generalizations. 
In any event, a population policy cannot be exclusively concerned 
with quantitative aspects. I t must take into account problems relat ing to 
the distribution of population between rural and urban areas and between 
large and small towns; and, above a l l , i t must concern i t s e l f with the 
qualitative aspects of the f u l l economic and soc ia l integration of the people. 
By doing so , i t w i l l enable the family to take conscious and responsible 
decisions about family s i z e and other important aspects of i t s economic, 
soc ia l and spir i tual l i f e , ' 
2# Speeding UP the rate of growth: p o s s i b i l i t i e s 
and requirements 
(a) The growth targets 
I t i s outside the scope of th i s document to determine the economic 
growth target that Latin America may attain in the 1970s, I t i s impossible 
to do so on the basis of a general analysis such as th i s ; a more spec i f i c 
study must be made of the conditions and prospects in each individual country. 
Moreover, the rate of growth wi l l depend on how intensive and far-reaching 
are the measures i t i s decided to adopt to remove internal structural 
obstacles, and on how successful ly the problem of the external bottleneck 
can be solved. Broadly speaking, the analysis of projections has provided 
useful cr i ter ia for c lari fying this problem. I t shows, on the one hand, the 
severe obstacles represented by the potential savings and foreign trade 
gaps and, on the other, the need for a vigorous and large-scale drive to 
absorb the labour force. 
I f an attempt was made to put forward a general est inate , in the 
l ight of these data, regarding a growth target for Latin America of 6 per cent, 
which i s the target established for the developing countries in the 
International Development Strategy, two considerations would be relevant* 
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First , several countries have already achieved such a rate, others are 
already close to i t , and the region as a whole has achieved i t during 
the past three years. Secondly, i f the serious problem of unemployment 
i s taken into account, the target should be s igni f icant ly higher for many 
countries. But in evaluating the structural factors, and especial ly the 
external bottleneck, i t may be concluded that a target of around 7 per cent 
.for the region as a whole 'would perhaps be the best working hypothesis. 
Consideration should, however, be given to the region's economic and 
technological backwardness and to the seriousness of the social problems 
that are threatening to become even more acute for half the Latin American 
population. The question must be asked whether, in view of this s i tuation, 
the Second Development Decade should not be translated, in essence, into 
a firm determination on the part of the Latin American countries and a 
speci f ic commitment on the part of the industrial countries and the 
international community to adopt the major decisions that w i l l enable Latin 
America to double i t s aggregate income by the end of the 1970s, through 
the f u l l u t i l i za t ion of i t s resources and a more equitable distribution 
of income among the different social strata. 
There i s one important aspect of strategy which relates to the 
movement of the growth rate over time. I t i s usually suggested that the 
rate should be raised in stages, starting from past trends and moving 
up gradually unt i l a speci f ic target rate i s attained at the end of a 
fa ir ly long period. 
A more e f fec t ive alternative, however, would be to speed up the tempo 
of economic ac t iv i ty , which for the sake of convenience and brevity can 
be referred as to the growth rate, as soon as possible. There are two 
reasons for doing th i s : f i r s t , the urgent need to give employment to the 
vast mass of labour available, and, secondly, the fact that the increase 
in the growth rate brought about by higher employment and other factors 
makes i t easier to ins t i tute the changes, structural reforms and 
adjustments that are needed, particularly with respect to income 
redistribution. A strategy of th is kind wi l l be easier to implement 
/precise ly because 
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precisely because the labour force i s larger, because of the signif icant 
and immediate e f fect of action to increase productivity and eff ic iency, 
and because of the large amount of idle capacity existing in the essential 
and consumer goods sectors. 
Account should also be taken of the great f l e x i b i l i t y shown by the 
Latin American countries in speeding up their growth rates, especially as 
they free themselves from external restrict ions. Admittedly, the 
implementation of this strategy would require external financial assistance, 
most of which would have to come in thé i n i t i a l stages up to the time when 
the external bottleneck may be expected to ease or disappear, 
(b) Social implications of growth 
It i s relevant to consider what are the conditions that are required 
in order to speed up the growth rate, given that this w i l l necessitate 
raising the savings and investment coef f ic ients , and also what impact 
this wi l l have on the welfare of the population, especially the vast 
underprivileged majority. This clearly involves consideration of how the 
benefits of development should be distributed among the social strata. 
In this connexion, and without claiming in any way that the figures 
represent a quantitative programme, some alternatives may be considered 
to i l lustrate the nature of the problems which have to be tackled. 
For example, i t i s possible that the poorer half of the population 
would increase i t s per capita consumption by per cent annually, while 
the middle-income groups would increase theirs rather more slowly. If 
this happened, the consumption of the high-income strata might contract 
i n i t i a l l y and then, after a certain time, begin to return to i t s former 
leve l . On this assumption, the poorer half of the population of the 
region would raise i t s present annual per capita consumption of 150 dollars 
to 300 dollars by the end of a seventeen-year period, while the middle-income 




Another alternative to be considered i s that of a per capita growth 
rate approaching 4 per cent with the poorer half of the population improving 
i t s per capita consumption by 4*7 per cent annually, the richer half 
increasing theirs by 2 per cent annually or more, depending on the over-all 
growth rate. According to this alternative, the poorer half of the 
population could double i t s consumption in f i f t e e n years. In other words, 
the higher the economic growth rate, the easier i t w i l l be to provide 
productive employment for the labour force and to raise the l eve l of 
consumption, and also the more feasible i t w i l l be to carry out the process 
of income redistribution referred to above. 
Austerity programmes or restraints on consumption affect ing the 
high-income groups are basical ly designed to increase the productive capacity 
of the economy. They are in no way an attempt to make a merely nominal 
redistribution of income - which in the f ina l analysis would not achieve 
i t s objective - but to mobilize the potential resources that exist as a 
result of the high concentration of personal income, and transform them 
into investment. 
The immediate e f f ec t of th i s kind of income redistribution policy 
would be a change in the structure of demand, since demand for mass 
consumption goods would increase relat ively more rapidly. On the basis of 
the working hypothesis discussed above, the over-all consumption of the 
low-income groups would grow by 7»8 per cent annually, their consumption 
of agricultural goods by 5*6 per cent and of non-agricultural goods and 
services by 8.9 per cent, while the over-all consumption of the remainder 
of the population would r i se at s l ight ly over 5 per cent annually. Hence 
i t i s clear that there have to be changes in the structure of production 
and in the way resources are allocated to the various sectors. 
This kind of process, which affects the structure of demand, would 
have two ef fects of special significance: i t would broaden domestic 
markets, creating strong incentives for the expansion of industrial and 
agricultural production, and, as the structure of production changes under 




absorption of labour would be added to the growth rate, since i t i s well known 
that the traditional industries are the most highly labour-intensive. 
The process would also influence the composition or at least the 
distribution of imports, although, as seen in the preceding chapter, there 
would certainly be a considerable increase in the need for imports of 
essential and capital goods. This again means that these essential 
objectives of development strategy are dependent to a large extent on 
covering the potential balance-of-payments d e f i c i t , and hence that external 
financial assistance, especially in the i n i t i a l stages, i s of v i ta l importance, 
(c) Mobilizing domestic resources 
Speeding up the pace of economic growth-and absorbing structural 
unemployment wi l l - as noted above - require an unusually large amount of 
real investment directed towards clearly defined ends. It has been estimated 
that gross investment, which now stands at some 22,000 million dollars 
in the eighteen countries studied, wi l l have to exceed 40,000 million 
dollars by 1975 and 57>000 million by I960 i f an average annual growth rate 
of 7 per cent i s to be sustained throughout the 1970s. These investment 
needs wi l l have to be covered by increased industrial production and by 
imports. 
Basic intermediate goods and capital goods production has been one 
of the most thriving sectors of industry in recent years. It wi l l have to 
grow much faster s t i l l , however, to attain the targets discussed in the 
present document, and th i s cannot be achieved unless the maximum possible 
amount of resources i s channelled into the production of such goods. This 
means that the instal lat ion of capacity for the production of certain 
types of non-essential or luxury goods for public and private consumption 
wi l l have to be curtailed. I t may even be necessary to consider the 
poss ibi l i ty of shift ing the allocations of resources to some extent, for 
example, away from the production of consumer durables. 
Studies show that the large and medium-sized Latin American countries 
could substantially increase their production of investment goods, and 




production of some of these items« I t i s well known, however, that the 
production of capital and intermediate goods i s seriously restricted by 
the size of markets, the amount' of investment needed, or by technical 
requirements» A well-<iesigned industrial policy would lay down guidelines 
for a rational allocation of resources in this area. Regional integration 
and subregional agreements have a very important part to play in placing 
Latin America in a better position to increase i t s production of essential 
intermediate goods, equipment and machinery. The recent figures for trade 
in manufactures - which include some capital goods — among the countries 
of the Latin American Free Trade Association (ALALC) are a promising 
indication of what may be achieved in the future. 
Despite the progress that must be made in the domestic production „ 
of capital goods, and the impetus t o development provided by integration, 
i t i s clear that Latin America will need a relatively large volume of 
imports, especially durirg the f i r s t half of the 1970s, i f i t i s to 
implement a development policy that i s l i k e l y to attain the desired goals., 
It must be borne in mind that imports of various types of capital goods 
and of some basic intermediate goods for capital formation account for 
roughly 20 per cent of the value of investment. While this proportion is 
somewhat lower in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, i t i s higher in the majority 
of the l e s s developed countries. The share of imports in the total domestic 
supply of machinery arai equipment - but not in investment - i s very high, 
ranging from 30 to 80 per cent or more, depending on the degree of development 
of the country concerned, the average for the region as a whole being 
approximately 40 per cent. These figures show how very vulnerable Latin 
America's development i s and how much any policy to mobilize resources 
depends on external factors. 
Two conclusions can be drawn from a comparison of the high import 
content of real investment with the large potential balànce-of-payments 
de f i c i t : (a) that import policy must complement an over-all domestic policy 
that assigns resources to productive and useful investment s t r i c t ly in 
terms of development objectives; and (b), that, since the minimum of imports 
of essential and capital goods create a trade gap, external financial 
assistance i s imperative. 
/ (d) Mobilizing 
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(d) Mobilizing id le capacity 
Sta t i s t i c s indicate that there i s id le capacity - in some cases 
on a considerable scale - in various branches of industry, especially 
those producing essential intermediate goods and consumer goods. 
Irrespective of the reason for this - limited power supplies, shortage 
of complement ary goods, or institutional factors relating to the 
organization and management of enterprises - i t i s evident that Latin 
America cannot afford to l e t these resources go to waste. If id le 
capacity exists because of limitations in demand or shortages of 
complementary goods, raising the growth rate of the economy wi l l tend 
to take up the slack. On the other hand, i f i t i s due to institutional 
or organizational factors in either the public or the private sector, 
development policy wi l l have to include appropriate measures to overcome 
these obstacles. Using installed productive capacity to the fu l l e s t 
extent possible, which might even be done by increasing the number of work 
sh i f t s , would help to raise the capital-output ratio and have a direct 
ef fect on the absorption of unemployed labour, 
(e) Mobilizing the labour force 
The vast reservoir of manpower which i s available could be tapped 
to increase production and investment. Without, going into detai ls , which 
would involve consideration of the specif ic circumstances of individual 
countries, some general points are worth noting. Naturally enough, the 
absorption of manpower wi l l depend, in principle, on economic expansion 
end on the practical results of a policy for the ut i l i zat ion of capital and 
the adoption of production techniques that wil l not necessarily put men 
out of work while maintaining eff ic iency and productivity. In this 
connexion, i t hss been found that the number of employment opportunities 
wi l l have to increase at an appreciably faster rate than the labour force, 
and that the product per person enployed wi l l have to grow more rapidly 
than hitherto, i f the unemployed section of the labour force i s to be 
provided with genuinely productive employment. I t may be appropriate at 





First in importance i s the absorptive capacity of agriculture, 
because a good deal of the structural unemployment i s in this sector, 
and also because i t i s essential in many countries for agriculture to 
continue to increase i t s rate of anployment to a significant extent. I t s 
capacity to absorb labour mainly depends on the availability of land, the 
methods of cultivation, and production techniques. With regard to land, 
the research done by the Inter*-American Committee for Agricultural 
Development (CIDA) i s particularly enlightening. The following conclusion 
was reached in a study of s ix countries: i f , in minifundia areas, land and 
labour factors were suitably reallocated, the number of workers would have 
to f a l l from 4.4 million to 700,000, In contrast, i f the same labour-land 
ratio that exists in minifundia areas were to be applied to half the land 
belonging to large estates, the ownership of which i s highly concentrated, 
25 million members of the labour force could be absorbed,. 
Improving the low leve ls of l iv ing of the Latin American population 
wi l l require an expansion of the cultivated area, increases in production 
for domestic consumption, and diversification of agricultural production. 
This would result i n higher levels of productive employment, especially 
with respect to structural unemployment. There must be no delay in 
init iat ing an e xamination of agricultural production technology as i t 
relates to the rational use of land, labour and capital to promote greater 
absorption of manpower thanks to e f f i c i ent operation and rising productivity. 
While i t i s urgently necessary to modernize farming methods and increase 
productivity, a mechanization that frees labour from certain act iv i t i e s may 
be a waste of capital i f the resulting unemployment i s not absorbed by 
other act iv i t ies or i f machinery i s not used to capacity. This i s in no 
way an attempt to lay down rigid rules, but rather to draw attention to the 
need to formulate policies that take account of the type of crops, the 
size of farms, the various techniques applicable to given circumstances, 
and population.pressures on the land, "which a l l vary widely from country 
to country, and even within a single country. This topic has been given 
virtually no study in Latin America, especially as i t relates to development 




access roads and irrigation works, provide many opportunities for the direct 
employment of rural manpower. Lastly, a l l these aspects of employment, 
production techniques and the eff ic iency of the rural economy should be 
properly planned within agrarian reform programmes* 
With respect to non-agricultural act iv i t ies* the main poss ib i l i t i e s 
for absorbing manpower reside in mobilizing idle capacity, increasing-new 
investment, and selecting methods of production bearing in mind the employment 
opportunities they provide. An economic growth rate approaching 7 per cent 
annually would require a considerable increase, as noted earlier, in 
investment and infrastructure, since basic services would have to expand 
at the same or a higher rate, while industrial a c t i v i t i e s would probably 
have t o grow by 9 per cent annually. Furthermore, any policy that i s 
aimed primarily "at improving the l iving conditions of the lowest income 
groups must promote the development of production in traditional ac t iv i t i e s 
and housing construction, both of which arfe highly labour-intensive. 
Similarly, expanding social services with the same aim in view would 
stimulate the absorption of the structural unemployment existing in the 
government sector, 
( f ) Saving potential 
A policy which i s aimed at redistributing income in order to 
improve the material and cultural conditions in which the mass of the 
population l i v e , a policy that i s based essential ly on the mobilization 
of national resources, must define precisely what institutional reforms 
and what economic, financial and tax measures wi l l promote a sustained and 
relatively steady mobilization of those resources. I t i s imperative to 
prevent that process from leading to an inflationary spiral which might 
create serious social disruption and culminate in fa i lure to attain the 
objectives of development policy» 
I t must be borne in mind that among the masses the drive towards a 
more diversif ied pattern of consumption, stimulated by the habits of the 
high-income social groups, i s as strong as i t i s legitimate« An escontial 
feature of the above policy must be to establish the conditions and means 
which wi l l encourage the saving needed to finance the expansion of investment. 
/ i f large 
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If large segments of the population harnessed themselves to the saving 
e f fort , the result would undoubtedly be a powerful impetus towards 
increased consumption« 
I t i s therefore necessary to plan the mobilization of potential 
saving resources along with the mobilization of capital and labour 
resources. Li t t le i s known about the structure of the sources of saving, 
or about the uses of saving in private enterprise, the public sector and 
the various social sectors. The lack of research on th is question i s 
reflected in the weakness of national development plans with respect to 
monetary and financial policy. Two factors may be noted in relation to 
the present saving capacity: (a) more savings are probably generated than 
are actually invested; and (b)> the total savings in the middle-income and 
even in the quite low-income sectors of the population are fa ir ly 
substantial. They are associated with specif ic areas of investment, sueh 
as the construction of dwellings, social security programmes, especially 
when they are f i r s t introduced, and various kinds of personal insurance. 
Moreover, the habit of saving i s spreading, as is shown by the volume of 
deposits in commercial and savings banks in many countries. 
As stated previously, the present volume of savings measured in 
relation to investment, i s larger than that indicated by the saving 
coeff ic ient of about 17 per cent recorded for the region as a whole« 
Several important factors combine to reduce this volume through the saving 
and investment process. While inf lat ion may in sane cases have contributed 
to forced saving temporarily and at a high social cost , i t has had a pernicious 
e f f ec t on the saving-investment process* as i s borne out by experience in 
many countries. 
Domestic production of durable consumer goods has led, moreover, to 
the development of promotion and financing machinery which tends to absorb 
a sizable margin of resources that might have provided capital for essential 
ac t iv i t i e s . Another inf luential factor has been the effort to replace 
imported capital and intermediate goods by domestic production, since, 
although there i s no denying the positive aspects of this trend, the higher 





Lastly, the severe external bottleneck affecting most of the Latin 
American countries, and in particular, the deterioration in the terms of 
trade, have had adverse repercussions on domestic income, the capacity to 
save and the possibi l i ty of finding adequate financing for the import 
component of investment« Moreover, the gfowing amount of trasfer payments 
under the head of debt servicing and payment of interest on domestic 
investment, to which must be added outflows of national capital that may 
be sizable in some cases, have also reduced the resources available for 
domestic investment« 
Clearly, therefore, a policy designed to reduce the external bottleneck 
plan import substitution with an eye to reducing costs, rationalize public 
expenditure, thus increasing i t s eff iciency and curtailing unnecessary or 
deferrable consumption, promote greater financial s tabi l i ty , organize 
capital markets, and adopt measures for channelling resources into productive 
investment for economic and social purposes would ensure that present 
savings were put to better use» 
This would not suf f i ce , however; a considerable increase i s required 
in potential investment resources, and there are potential savings that must 
be mobilized» These resources would have to come mainly from the high-income 
groups, without of course excluding the contribution to be expected from 
the population at large as a result of the better conditions brought about 
by development. The potential savings that can be mobilized immediately 
are found precisely in the income that i s concentrated in the upper strata, 
which account for probably three-tenths of total consumption* What must be 
done, therefore, i s to apply an ef fect ive policy that wi l l act simultaneously 
on demand and supply, so that the resources absorbed by those consumption 
patterns - notably durable manufactures and luxury housing - wi l l be 
reduced or at l eas t restricted, 
(g) 
The function of external cooperation in the mobilization of resources 
Considering that the Latin American economies are heavily dependent 
for essential goods on external supplies and that the export prospects 
are unfavourable, i t i s necessary to secure external financial co-operation 




absorption of the labour force are to be achieved* This financial 
co-operation cannot be even a partial substitute for the mobilization 
of domestic resources, nor can i t represent an alternative to the expansion 
and diversification of exports. I ts fundamental role i s precisely to 
fac i l i ta te the mobilization of internal resources, by helping to provide 
the import component required until such time as domestic production can 
be expanded for.export or for viable import substitution. 
i 
If external financial co-operation f u l f i l s this specif ic function, 
i t s ef fects are of vital importance. An i l lustration of this point wi l l 
not be out of place here. I f , for example, the totaL import content of 
investment was assumed to be 20 per cent, and this component comprised 
essential and complementary goods,, 100 additional net external financing units 
uti l ized in promoting investment would stimulate an actual mobilization of 
internal resources equal to 400 units, with the consequent e f fects on 
employment.^ 
This multiplier e f fect would logical ly increase as the complementary 
import component of investment diminished in some countries» In other 
words, the rate of growth and the absorption of manpower can be appreciably 
accelerated through complementary external financing, but only provided that 
domestic policy promotes the mobilization of the additional domestic savings 
required. This i s the big problem to be resolved by development strategy 
and policy i f a rational absorption of external financing i s to be achieved. 
It i s also necessary* however, for the domestic saving coefficient to grow, 
so that the rate of economic growth can ultimately be freed from the shackles 
of continuing external indebtedness. Otherwise, the rate wil l slacken 
once again when, through the well-known process, the net contribution of 
external resources i s cancelled out, or when, for other reasons, contributions 
from external sources are cut back. 
i / If account i s taken of intermediate products, the direct and indirect 
import content of investment i s probably greater than 20 per cent for 




3* T^e dissemination of technological progress and the distribution 
of its , benefits „among the social strata 
(a) Employment and technological progress 
An examination of the production structure in Latin America, where 
possibly not more than 10 per cent - of the labour force i s employed in 
act iv i t ies with forms of production and organization that may be regarded 
as relatively modern, wi l l reveal the complexity and magnitude of the 
problem of absorbing the structural unemployment and the rapidly increasing 
labour force that are the by-product of population growth* In the interests 
of economic development, i t i s obviously essential for the economically 
active population to be incorporated in a dynamic process of growth, at 
reasonable l e v e l s of productivity which w i l l subsequently be raised by the 
workings of that process. If Latin America i s not to . fal l even further 
behind economically and technologically, i t must absorb technical advances 
with increasing rapidity and disseminate them in every sector of economic 
activity throughout the region» 
This raises two closely interrelated problems: how to increase capital 
formation and how to devise a policy that would make for the incorporation 
of technical advances and their dissemination i n the backward sectors, while 
achieving the employment objectives which are a key piece in the strategy 
envisaged®" 
The f i r s t aspect has already been considered; i t remains to point 
out that, under the conditions now prevailing in Latin America, the basic 
premise must be that the greater the mobilization of potential investment 
resources, the greater wi l l be the poss ib i l i t i e s of progressing technologically 
and raising productivity. However, this wi l l not immediately change the 
terms i n which the problem of a shortage of capital compared with the volume 
of available labour presents i t s e l f today. 
From a broad standpoint, i t may be said that the absorption of the 
labour force in productive act iv i t ies depends on four factors: (a) the 
dynamic growth of investment and production in general; (b) the sectoral 




and regional pattern of growth; (c) production technologies, from the 
point of view of the capital^labour ratio in different economic act iv i t ies ; 
(d) the specif ic measures that should be taken to draw labour into particular 
rural and urban act ivit ies« 
The development strategy outlined wi l l be favourable for these 
factors« The mobilization of domestic resources w i l l raise the growth rate 
of investment and production well above their present levels« Land reform, 
as indicated la ter , w i l l contribute very substantially to solving the 
problem of structural unemployment in rural areas, and may be expected to 
create the l ight conditions for a continued increase in employment« The 
changes that wi l l take place in the structure of demand as a or! the 
anticipated redistribution of income wi l l necessitate a more rapid increase 
in agricultural production ani in the production of goods and services in 
mass demand, which are relatively labour-intensive« The expansion in the 
output of capital goods wi l l also boost the demand for skil led labour, 
which wi l l be of greater significance than i s generally thought« Moreover, 
the poss ib i l i t i e s of employment wi l l also increase with the diversif ication 
and expansion of exports and reciprocal trade, which are the other strategic 
factors involved« 
Nevertheless, whatever technological choices are offered within the 
context of the new structure of production wi l l have to be analysed with 
a view to deciding on a specif ic policy for the assignment of capital 
resources in relation to the productive absorption of labour« In spite of 
the v i ta l importance of this problem for the developing countries, l i t t l e 
attention has been paid to i t thus far, either in analyses or in practical 
action. È2X that can be done, therefore, i s to set forth some general estimates* 
In principle, great poss ib i l i t i e s may be discerned for improving 
eff ic iency and productivity while absorbing manpower, without substantial 
investment being entailed* Such technological poss ib i l i t ies are to be found 
mainly in agriculture, construction, and a wide range of services; the 
problem seems to be more d i f f i c u l t to solve in industry« 
There are some key industrial sectors of the economy in which great 
technological progress i s accompanied by a higi capital intensity. This , i s 




c h e m i c a l , s t ee lmaking and n o n - f e r r o u s meta l s i n d u s t r i e s » I n t h e s e and 
o t h e r a c t i v i t i e s , t e c h n i c a l p r o g r e s s r a i s e s t h e minimum s c a l e s o f 
produc t ion . On t h e o t h e r hand, t h e s i t u a t i o n i s q u i t e d i f f e r e n t i n a 
g r e a t many a c t i v i t i e s which account f o r a l a r g e p r o p o r t i o n o f manufacturing 
p r o d u c t i o n . The meta l~ t r a n s f orming, t e x t i l e and consumer goods i n d u s t r i e s , 
f o r i n s t a n c e , a r e c h a r a c t e r i z e d by a g r e a t e r v a r i e t y of equiprant and 
s lower t e c h n o l o g i c a l development , and t h e r e a r e p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f choos ing 
more l a b o u r - i n t e n s i v e and c a p i t a l - s a v i n g t e c h n i q u e s . I n p r a c t i c e , 
however, t h e s e o p p o r t u n i t i e s are not turned t o account» The investment 
i n c e n t i v e s , c r e d i t t e r m s , low r e a l i n t e r e s t r a t e s , o v e r v a l u a t i o n o f t h e 
currency and o t h e r f a c t o r s prompt e n t e r p r i s e s , whether p u b l i c o r p r i v a t e , 
t o U3e h i g h l y c a p i t a l - i n t e n s i v e t e c h n i q u e s . 
There i s another p a r t i c u l a r l y important f a c t o r l i m i t i n g the c h o i c e 
o f t e c h n i q u e s : t h e dependence on e x t e r n a l s u p p l i e s o f c a p i t a l goods , and 
on the a s s i m i l a t i o n o f f o r e i g n know-how» I n t h e i n d u s t r i a l countr i e s^ 
unceas ing t e c h n o l o g i c a l p r o g r e s s g o e s hand i n hand w i t h a very h i g h l e v e l 
o f c a p i t a l i n t e n s i t y , and t h o s e t e c h n i q u e s o f t e n r e l a t e t o an environment 
and a supply o f n a t u r a l r e s o u r c e s which a r e very d i f f e r e n t from t h o s e 
t h a t are u s u a l l y found i n d e v e l o p i n g countr i e s» N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e i r 
i n t r o d u c t i o n i s encouraged by programmes of a i d and by systems of e x t e r n a l 
f i n a n c i n g , which, moreover, i n v o l v e very h igh c o s t s . 
These g e n e r a l comments show t h a t , w h i l e s e r i o u s l i m i t a t i o n s e x i s t , 
t h e r e are a l s o s i g n i f i c a n t p o s s i b i l i t i e s » There appears t o b e q u i t e a 
broad f i o l d f o r making p r o g r e s s i n the i n t r o d u c t i o n of new t e c h n o l o g y and 
r a i s i n g p r o d u c t i v i t y i n t h e more backward s e c t o r s o f the economy wi thout 
n e c e s s a r i l y hampering the a t ta inment o f c e r t a i n g e n e r a l employment 
o b j e c t i v e s » . I t must be remembered, o f course , t h a t new t e c h n o l o g y cannot 
be in t roduced i n t o a l l s e c t o r s or a c t i v i t i e s i n t h e same way, e i t h e r because 
of p h y s i c a l l i m i t a t i o n s or because o f t h e a c t u a l mechanics o f t h e p r o c e s s . 
Hence, i n c r e a s e s i n p r o d u c t i v i t y i n a p a r t i c u l a r s e c t o r may d i s p l a c e 
labour or c u r t a i l i t s a b s o r p t i o n , and t h i s means t h a t t h e p r o c e s s must 
promote a dynamic i n c r e a s e i n inves tment i n order t o prevent unemployment» 
I t i s n a t u r a l t h a t t h e high-income groups i n a r e a s where t echno logy i s 
advancing r a p i d l y w i l l have a p r o p e n s i t y t o i n c r e a s e t h e i r consumption and 
/ t h a t t h e 
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that the concentration of income wi l l promote demand for certain goods, 
thus absorbing resources that might otherwise be umd to expand employment 
opportunities. This i s where development strategy should come in, through 
a policy that reaps the benefits of increases in productivity by holding 
down consumption of luxury goods and promoting over-all saving in order to 
increase the amount of investment resources available to sbac;:^ labour in 
other areas. 
In brief , this i s a problem whose solution i s of overwhelmla? importance 
for development strategy in Latin America, In the l ight of what has been 
said above, three general conclusions can be drawn« (a) certain ac t iv i t i e s 
relating to the production of intermediate and capital goods and to the 
expansion of exports of manufactures wi l l have to be given priority 
attention on a scale and with amounts of capital consonant with 
technological progress; (b) there are many act iv i t ies in which a wellniesigned 
policy could lead to better use of capital and greater absorption of labourj 
(c) solutions to the problem must be viewed within the context of national 
planning so that other important factors are borne in mindo Moreover, 
technological research wi l l have to be intensi f ied in Latin America, 
while policy wi l l have to cover such questions as how to adapt imported 
technology to local conditions and how to stimulate original research. 
For this to be done, co-operation among the countries of the region and the 
implementation of joint programmes wi l l be of vital importance, given the 
general similarity of the circumstances of the different countries and of 
the problems that have to be tackled, 
(b) Regional imbalances 
A close study must be made of the regional aspects of national 
development* In recent years there has been a growing concern with 
technical factors and practical action. Several countries are carrying 
out large-scale regional development projects, and a fund of experience 
and know-how i s being bui l t up. The most important thing i s to work out 
clear conceptual definitions of regional problems so as to pinpoint more 
precisely the key elements in development strategy. As regards ihe^prabtical 
tools for applying the strategy., i t may be argued that these cannot be 
constructed unti l the regional objectives related to the economic and social 
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integration of the countries themselves have been studied. Over-all 
national development plans are obviously weak in th i s respect. Progress 
was f i r s t made in analysing the productive structure of the economic 
development process, and the model must now be supplemented by an analysis 
of the regional structures. 
I t i s essential t o translate the major strategy objectives into 
regional terms and to go beyond the traditional divisions between urban 
and rural, agricultural and non-agricultural, so as to study the economic 
and social structures of the different regions in a country, of the 
metropolitan areas, and of the big and small towns. It i s also necessary 
to see how the goals of greater production, the absorption of the economically 
active population and the redistribution of income f i t into that picturej 
how national resources are to.be mobilized, land reform carried out, 
production techniques applied, export trade expanded and Latin American 
integration speeded up, and what the ef fect of a l l these measures wi l l be. 
It can be seen that when development problems are considered in relation 
to the geographical location of economic act iv i ty , strategy acquires a 
more v i ta l significance and i s more intimately bound up with the future 
economic and social pattern of the Latin American countries. 
It i s essential to know whether the economic growth that i s envisaged 
wi l l be taking place in the exist ing areas and centres, thereby adding to 
the concentration of resources and exacerbating the disparit ies , and 
whether the march of Latin American integration wil l lead to more balanced 
regional development within the countries themselves. Finally, i t i s 
imperative to formulate a de f in i t e regional policy in order to determine , 
the basic features of the policy to be applied to transport and communications 
and to the location and distribution of energy. 
Although uniform principles cannot be laid down for a regional policy 
covering a l l the countries in the region, there are some common aspects that 
may be brought out. If the domestic an<̂  foreign factors which have in the 
past determined the physiognomy of the Latin American economies are 
discounted, i t i s obvious that the concentration of resources in particular 
areas i s just i f iable in the early stages of a development process as a means, 
of taking advantage of the favourable conditions that determine productivity. 
/However, i t 
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However, i t would not be advisable to allow th i s concentration to continue 
unless the following two conditions were fu l f i l l ed : that the resources 
concentrated in such areas would be more productive than i f they were 
located elsewhere, and that the areas in question are capable of galvanizing 
the rest of the system into act ivi ty so that a growing number of people can . 
achieve similar l eve l s of productivity and income. 
In Latin America, and i t s big metropolitan areas in particular, external 
economies have noticeably declined. There i s a tremendously high urban 
concentration, even compared with the more developed countries. The 
exceptionally rapid population growth, as a result of intensive migration 
from the country to the town, has outpaced the capacity of the public 
services and i s raising the per capita costs of the infrastructure. 
Under these conditions, the advantages perceived from an evaluation 
of an investment project are usually cancelled out by the growing social 
costs of any further expansion of the major centres. Moreover, the 
abi l i ty of these centres to act as a tonic on the rest of the economy i s 
limited., or at least l e s s than i s required to achiever„the necessary 
economic and social growth, to say nothing of the fact that accumulated 
structural unemployment creates a problem for the centres themselves. 
There are several explanations for the lack of dynamism. One 
general reason i s that when people are absorbed into economic ac t iv i t i e s 
in a particular centre, even in unproductive services, they naturally tend 
to raise the l eve l of consumption, and the high concentration of income 
increases the demand for new goods, with the result that the increment 
i n productivity i s only partly transformed into investment resources, 
which are largely appropriated by the centre i t s e l f . 
It i s therefore in keeping with the strategy outlined above that 
there should be a well-conceived policy to drain off some of the increase t 
in productivity to swell investment in other areas, as dictated by the 
rational principles deriving from a regional policy in the context of. 
over-all national development. This i s not an easy problem to tackle, 
and generalizations are hazardous. 
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In the las t analysis, the solution must be viewed in a comprehensive 
and long-term perspective. An immediate shift in investment might 
s ignify a lower over-all rate of growth than would be obtainable i f there 
were no such shi f t since regional programmes need heavy infrastructural 
investment with fa ir ly long lead times. However, the over-all growth of 
the econoiry would no doubt eventually be higher than i t would have been 
otherwise* 
What i s more, regional programmes obviously have a beneficial e f fect 
on employment and income distribution and represent a decisive step 
towards the economic and social development and integration of the 
Latin American countries. The new centres would become focuses of 
growth whose dynamic influence would spread far and wide to other areas 
as yet untouched. Considerations of national policy or social desiderata 
nay, of course, take precedence over economic criteria in this f i e ld , but 
the la t ter must always be borne in mind so that the most effect ive 
solution can be found when the policy decisions are taken, 
(°) The social aspects of income distribution 
3 / 
A number of studies have described the peculiar characteristics 
of income distribution in Latin America, which was discussed in Chapter.I, 
and have indicated the main factors underlying the prevailing situation, 
A knowledge of these factors i s obviously a prerequisite for any attempt 
to formulate objectives and measures to redistribute income in a way 
that i s more favourable to development and the welfare of the community. 
These studies clearly show the complexity of the situation, particularly 
as regards the e f fec t of certain factors that are often discounted or 
ignored. These include the factors mentioned earl ier and also structural 
unemployment, the distribution of employment and leve ls of productivity, 
3/ SEE, for example, Economic Survey of Latin America, 19^9, OP c i t 
Part- Three, "Income distribution in Latin America", and Income 
in Latin America (United Kations Publication, 




and technological progress. Quite obviously, in order for people to-be 
able to participate e f fec t ive ly in the process of income distribution, 
the f i r s t essential i s for them to have their place in the economically 
active population and not to be excluded from the productive process, , 
either because production has not yet reached certain sectors or areas, 
or because some of the labour force i s unable.to move to or be,absorbed 
in the areas where production does take place. 
Realisation of such factors makes i t possible to go beyorid the 
over-simple concept of what may be termed "redistributionism", which 
consist of nothing more than transfering monetary or real income among 
individuals and groups, without modifying the structural factors that are 
the root cause of the unequal distribution of income among the social 
strata. Moreover, an appreciation of the root causes helps to give a 
clearer idea of the close and necessary link between the aim of redistributing 
income on the one hand, and development strategy in the str ict sense, 
on the other, as noted earl ier in connexion with the basic objective of 
raising the growth rate. 
Nevertheless, however essential i t may be to f ind answers for the 
problems outlined above, th i s i s not enough in i t s e l f , to sat i s fy the 
desire for a more equitable sharing of income among the different social 
groups« The studies cited show that even where technological progress 
has penetrated and taken root, there i s a tendency for there to be similar 
and even greater imbalances in personal income and in that of social groups, 
although at higher l eve l s in absolute terms. In other words, the benefits 
of the increased productivity of ac t iv i t i e s that are becoming more 
capital-intensive also tend to be concentrated to a considerable degree, 
i , e « , the process i s not enough to ensure a progressive redistribution of 
income. Hence, consistent and effect ive action i s required i f individuals 
or families and social groups are to obtain a fairer share of income 
- action that must be considered complementary t o , and in no sense a 
substitute for, any action designed to modify the structural factors 




Given the data avai lable, i t might be argued that in t h i s l a t t e r 
respect any progressive changes w i l l to a large extent depend on such 
changes as the following: 
(a) An improvement i n the bargaining power of the underprivileged 
groups, which means that they must organize themselves much more 
e f f e c t i v e l y and that the State must support and push their claims; 
(b) Definite progress in reducing the all-too-apparent concentration 
of the ownership of property, which, in certain countries, basical ly 
amounts t o ownership of agricultural land, but in others i s somewhat 
more complex; 
(c) A radical expansion of the opportunity system and, hence, greater 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s for social nobility, especial ly vert ica l mobility in the 
sense of upward movement in jobs and functions. This involves, in 
addition to changes in the general framework, much more intensive e f for t 
ar-d9 in particular, se lect ive action to improve access and t r ^rigbhen 
a£v-encfenee at educational ins t i tu t ions , t o improve health czve and 
increase the supply of housing and other essent ia l goods and services, 
in such a way that the benef i ts go in the f i r s t instance to the groups 
that have hitherto had l i t t l e or no opportunity to enjoy them. 
(d) Aspects of income distribution policy 
la view of the foregoing, i t may be appropriate to consider some 
of the aspects that w i l l have to be borne in mind in a policy for 
redistributing income, This w i l l be in no sense an attempt to lay down 
a strategy for action, but rather to ident i fy the choices available 
and the complementary measures required in order to c lar i fy the nature 
of the problem and assess the comparative effect iveness of different 
approaches. Having said t h i s , i t i s advisable to differentiate between 
those aspects which have to do with the dissemination (or concentration) 
of technological progress in productive sectors, strata or regions, 
and those which are linked more d irect ly to-the distribution^ of the 




From the standpoint of the former, i t would seem evident that the 
key question i s the amount of the potential and actual savings or surplus 
generated by the highly productive capital-intensive ac t i v i t i e s of what 
my be described as the modern sector, to which reference was made 
earl ier, and to the way in which they are used. The actual surplus i s 
the amount which really goes into investment. The potential surplus, 
which i s very d i f f i c u l t t o quantify precisely, i s the actual surplus plus 
the amount of resources used for the consumption of luxury goods or goods 
with a low socio-economic priority that could be turned into self"multiplying 
capital. 
Understandably enough, the f i r s t and most essential objective i s 
to increase the actual surplus to the utmost so that i t comes,close to 
potential investment capacity. However important th i s may be, i t i s not, 
nevertheless, the most important point, which has to do with decisions 
regarding the use or allocation of investment resources by the most 
highly productive and - presumably - the most profitable enterprises. 
The crux of the matter i s what proportion of such resources should 
be assigned to the sector generating them, and what proportion to other 
ac t iv i t i e s , or more speci f ical ly to the infrastructure, basic services 
and the sectors or regions that have been relatively or absolutely deprived 
of investment and modernization and therefore of any increase in 
productivity. 
What i s more, i t would seem obvious that unless an adequate part of 
the surplus generated in ac t i v i t i e s in which technological progress has 
been concentrated i s channelled towards other a c t i v i t i e s , i t w i l l be 
impossible to leve l out the imbalances evident at different l eve l s . 
Quite the reverse - i f th i s i s not done, i t can reasonably be assumed 
that the imbalances wi l l become more pronounced. Clearly, th i s i s a l l 
subject to the requirements of the modern sector that i s in existence or 
i s being formed, which for obvious reasons has priority ca l l on and 
decision-making power over the use of i t s own resources (except for the 
amount which the State pre-empts and re-al locates) . 
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While on this point, and without disregarding what was said in 
sections (a) and (b) of t h i s chapter, i t would seem essential to 
differentiate roughly between the possible alternative uses of the. 
investment resources generated by the highly productive a c t i v i t i e s . 
On the one hand there are the resources used to modernize and expand the 
basic development centres and to meet the demand for essential goods and 
o 
services, including goods and services that might be considered of 
secondary importance but which are already in widespread use. On the 
other are resources and investment used for purposes whose economic and 
social impact i s limited and which nay be associated with certain 
consumption patterns or be designed to sat i s fy the conspicuous consumption 
demand of high-income groups (luxury buildings, for instance) or to 
promote uneconomic overcrowding in metropolitan areas. 
I t can be agreed that the primary uses of the surplus of the modern 
sector cannot and should not be affected since they, in the f inal analysis, 
are the basic foundation (actually or potentially) for expanding the system 
and attenuating internal imbalances, to say nothing of the sin re.required 
for expanding and diversifying foreign trade. On the other hand, the 
amount of investment going to secondary uses can clearly be reduced to a 
greater or lesser extent, depending on how much i s earmarked for primary 
uses. 
This leads directly to the basic question of the distribution of 
investment, and hence to the need to c lar i fy and refine ideas regarding 
the social and over-all productivity of investment, bearing in mind the 
impact of income distribution from the viewpoint taken above. 
Furthermore, th i s question i s necessarily linked with that of the 
machinery needed to channel resources for capital formation in the 
directions outlined above. Although, as noted earl ier, th i s document 
i s not intended to go very deeply into th i s topic , some comments nay 
be useful . 
There are a number of alternative ways of promoting or achieving the 
desired objective, which are not mutually exclusive but rather complementary. 
The most direct method would probably be to t ransfer a large portion of the 
surplus to the State or public agencies, on the assumption that they would 




Another method would be to provide a variety of incentives t o ensure 
the same result through the decisions of those controlling the surplus« 
This i s what has happened with a number of regional, sectoral (chiefly in 
agriculture) and social programmes (the case of investment in low-cost 
housing) implemented in Latin America, which have yielded valuable 
lessons that have not yet been properly evaluated. 
In addition to these and other measures that aim at affecting or 
influencing the distribution of investment, there are other measures that . 
have similar aims7but operate mainly by changing the composition of demand. 
For th is i t i s necessary to look at the problems from the other standpoint 
mentioned, i . e . , that of the distribution of incomfe among social groups 
and the distribution of personal income. 
This situation too* has been very clearly described in the studies 
cited earlier; consists in an excessively large share of income - compared 
with other areas and countries - being concentrated in the top 5 per cent 
of the income pyramid. 
< 
As a rough guide for purposes of discussion, three alternative methods 
of changing th i s glaringly obvious situation for the better can be 
considered. For example, i t i s possible to imagine procedures for transferring 
some or a l l of the income of t h i s top 5 per cent xtfhich i s i:i excess of the 
leve l of income of the top 5 per cent in industrialized countries; this 
might mean that as much as 10 per cent of tota l income, although not in 
absolute terms* would be transferred to the bottom half of the income 
pyramid. 
Without going into a l l the serious obstacles and disadvantages that 
this.alternative represents in many respects (operational, po l i t ica l , 
real , possible e f fec t s on savings, e t c . ) , i t would seem clear from the 
above that i t would not appreciably or permanently affect the basic 
determinants of what i s known as structural poverty. 
A second alternative would be to collect the surplus income, mainly 
by f i s ca l means, with a view to providing the marginal population with 
essential goods and services either gratis or at heavily subsidized 
prices. Without going into a l l the arguments against t h i s alternative, 
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i t can be stated that i t i s broader in scope than the f i r s t alternative, 
particularly because of the greater impact and consequences of certain 
social expenditures such as those relating to education and health. 
Nevertheless, i t i s also clear that th i s alternative only has an a posteriori 
e f fec t on the, real reasons for the plight of the.underprivileged majority 
(unemployment, irregular or wretchedly paid work, location in minimally 
productive regions, sectors or a c t i v i t i e s , e t c . ) . In br ie f , by i t s e l f , 
i t would turn out to be more of a pal l iat ive than a remedy, although th i s 
i s not to say that i t cannot be e f fect ive or that i t i s of no value. 
The third alternative might consist in allocating or re-allocating 
the potential savings to purposes that are intended to modify the basic 
determinants of the income structure. These might range from direct 
measures (such as the creation of regular opportunities for productive 
work, and not merely emergency opportunities, which properly belong under # 
the second alternative) to changes in the over-all structure of development, 
changes in relative social bargaining power and "deconcentrating" the 
ownership of property. 
These different methods are not alternatives in the str ict sense 
of the term, but rather approaches that can be combined together, bearing 
in mind their relative importance and effectiveness and specific national 
circumstances, in terms of stage of development and the pol i t ica l and 
inst itutional framework. 
Income distribution strategy, in br ie f , requires a coherent blend 
of the two types of objectives indicated, and their general and specif ic 
translation into measures and instruments that w i l l help to bring about 
the desired changes in the income structure.and, in the f ina l analysis 
in the social content of development i t s e l f . 
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4« The over-all objectives of the strategy with respect 
to the external sector 
It i s clear from what was said in chapter I and at the beginning of 
the present chapter that the general objectives of a Latin American 
development strategy have to do with three closely interrelated external 
factors and with action on the domestic front. These factors are: 
(a) vulnerability to and dependence on external circumstancesj (b) the terms 
and conditions governing trade; and (c) the arrangements for external 
co-operation in national development e f forts , 
(a) Vulnerability and dependence 
A development strategy for Latin America must lay down specif ic 
objectives and measures to deal with the region1s extreme vulnerability 
and dependence in the external sector, which hamper and restr ict i t s 
development. While i t would be beyond the scope of the present study to 
go into this topic, because of i t s diversity and also because i t involves 
decisions which are matters of State policy, some points should be noted 
which relate more directly to the economic, financial and technological 
questions discussed here. 
First , Latin American development must be based mainly on Latin 
America's own capacity and the effectiveness of the policy and strategy 
adopted to mobilize the region's own resources. As noted above, external 
borrowing i s admissible only in so far as i t i s complementary, and there 
must be a firm determination to free the future growth rate from i t s 
dependence on external assistance; otherwise, development wi l l be at 
the mercy of the winds of chance and of a l l the different international 
pol i t ica l and financial factors that affect the flow of external resources. 
Here, the multilateralization of financial assistance for development 
projects i s of primary importance. 
Secondly, Latin America*s virtually complete dependence on imported 
technology makes i t very d i f f i c u l t to use resources e f f i c i ent ly . I t i s 
therefore necessary to study suitable ways and means of introducing new 
technology select ively and adapting i t to f i t local conditions and the 





T h i r d l y , L a t i n America's h i g h d e g r e e o f dependence on imports o f 
e s s e n t i a l and c a p i t a l goods i s another l i m i t i n g f a c t o r t h a t can be overcome 
o n l y through an expans ion o f product ion and t r a d e . 
I t w i l l be d i f f i c u l t f u l l y t o a c h i e v e t h e s e and o t h e r o b j e c t i v e s t h a t 
a f f e c t L a t i n America's a b i l i t y t o s t r e n g t h e n i t s development and p r e s e r v e 
t h e s o v e r e i g n independence o f i t s d e c i s i o n s r e g a r d i n g deve lopment , i f each 
country a c t s i n i s o l a t i o n , d e s p i t e t h e g r e a t p o t e n t i a l o f the l a r g e r c o u n t r i e s 
o f t h e r e g i o n . S tronger and more concer ted a c t i o n must be taken a t the 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l l e v e l t o promote L a t i n America's i n t e r e s t s , and t o s o l v e t h e 
enormous problems o f t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n and s t i m u l a t i o n o f t e c h n o l o g i c a l 
p r o g r e s s and t h e expans ion o f p r o d u c t i o n , w i t h i n t h e framework o f e f f e c t i v e 
r e g i o n a l c o - o p e r a t i o n and a community o f i n t e r e s t s . Hence, t h i s r e a p p r a i s a l 
o f the problems and o b s t a c l e s encountered i n r e g i o n a l i n t e g r a t i o n i s 
u r g e n t l y n e c e s s a r y b e c a u s e , a s i n t e g r a t i o n becomes more f i r m l y e s t a b l i s h e d , 
L a t i n America w i l l be a b l e t o make i t s presence f e l t and i n c r e a s e i t s 
development p o t e n t i a l w i t h i n t h e community o f n a t i o n s * 
Mention has a l r e a d y been made o f t h e concern aroused by the growing 
i n f i l t r a t i o n o f f o r e i g n c a p i t a l i n commercial , i n d u s t r i a l and f i n a n c i a l 
a c t i v i t i e s , par t o f which i s u s e d t o buy up o r a c q u i r e an i n t e r e s t i n 
L a t i n American f i r m s . The t e c h n i c a l and o t h e r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f t h e s e 
f i r m s seldom make such t a k e - o v e r s j u s t i f i a b l e , s i n c e n e i t h e r t h e t e c h n o l o g i c a l 
and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l r e q u i r e m e n t s , nor even t h e volume o f inves tment needed, 
are beyond t h e powers o f L a t i n American e n t e r p r i s e a t i t s p r e s e n t s t a g e 
o f deve lopment . 
This trend o f e v e n t s i s l i a b l e to wreck the c o n t r i b u t i o n which i t 
i s hoped t h a t f o r e i g n p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e w i l l make to L a t i n American 
economic development . The t e c h n i c a l and f i n a n c i a l c o - o p e r a t i o n t h a t 
can be obta ined from t h i s source i s v e r y important , p a r t i c u l a r l y f o r 
encouraging t h e growth and e f f i c i e n c y o f L a t i n American e n t e r p r i s e . 
Consequent ly , t h e L a t i n American c o u n t r i e s must adopt w e l l - d e f i n e d p o l i c i e s 
i n t h i s a r e a . These p o l i c i e s should have two b a s i c a ims: f i r s t , t h e 
t e c h n i c a l and f i n a n c i a l s t r e n g t h e n i n g o f n a t i o n a l e n t e r p r i s e s , whether 
p u b l i c o r p r i v a t e , and o f m u l t i n a t i o n a l L a t i n American e n t e r p r i s e s forming 
p a r t o f the i n t e g r a t i o n movenent, and, s e c o n d l y , the framing o f a c l e a r 
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f o r e i g n inves tment p o l i c y . The ways i n which f o r e i g n c a p i t a l can c o - o p e r a t e 
are through t h e t r a n s f e r o f t e c h n i c a l know-how, t h e improvement o f t h e 
o r g a n i z a t i o n and e f f i c i e n c y o f e n t e r p r i s e s , and t h e e l i m i n a t i o n o f t h e 
impediments which cramp L a t i n American development a s can be done by e x p o r t 
promotion. 
With t h e s e g o a l s , n a t i o n a l programmes should determine t h e areas i n 
which e x t e r n a l inves tment i s needed, and t h e ways i n which t e c h n i c a l 
know-how and modern forms o f o r g a n i z a t i o n can be adopted and p o p u l a r i z e d . 
The L a t i n American c o u n t r i e s w i l l have t o take c o - o r d i n a t e d a c t i o n t o win 
t h e c o - o p e r a t i o n and support o f t h e i n d u s t r i a l i s e d c o u n t r i e s and o f f o r e i g n 
e n t e r p r i s e s and i n v e s t o r s f o r t h e i r n a t i o n a l p o l i c i e s , f o r new modes o f 
f o r e i g n c a p i t a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n whereby t h e investment would be g r a d u a l l y 
t r a n s f e r r e d t o t h e n a t i o n a l p u b l i c or p r i v a t e s e c t o r s , and f o r o t h e r 
measures t o be taken by t h e c a p i t a l - e x p o r t i n g c o u n t r i e s t o promote and 
support inves tment i n d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s , A s p e c i a l e f f o r t should be 
made to exp lore supplementary or a l t e r n a t i v e methods o f t r a n s f e r r i n g 
t e c h n o l o g i c a l advances t o t h e n a t i o n a l economies and o f ensur ing t h e i r 
wide d i s s e m i n a t i o n . 
(b ) The b a s i c a s p e c t s o f t rade p o l i c y 
With regard t o t r a d e p o l i c y , i t would seem reasonab le t o s t a r t from 
t h e assumption t h a t , u n l e s s t h e e x t e r n a l b o t t l e n e c k i s removed, t h e main-
spr ing o f economic and s o c i a l growth i n t h e r e g i o n w i l l be s e r i o u s l y 
impaired and may become even weaker than i n t h e p a s t . However, i t would be 
u n r e a l i s t i c t o b e l i e v e t h a t a l l t h a t needs t o be done t o i n c r e a s e L a t i n 
America's inadequate and even d e c l i n i n g share o f world t r a d e i s t o open 
up the markets , i n t h e hope t h a t t h e spontaneous growth o f e x p o r t s or 
c o m p e t i t i o n a t home would a u t o m a t i c a l l y l ead to g r e a t e r e f f i c i e n c y and a 
new economic d r i v e forward. In t r u t h , what i s needed i s a c l e a r d e f i n i t i o n 
o f the main o b j e c t i v e s , accompanied by a f i r m d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o implement 
g e n e r a l and s p e c i f i c measures t o a c h i e v e them, which i n t h i s c a s e o b v i o u s l y 
cannot be done w i t h o u t e x t e r n a l d e c i s i o n s a l s o . 
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If a comprehensive picture i s painted of the essential elements 
and functions of foreign trade policy, the following broad objectives 
wi l l emerge: (a) expansion of export income as the fundamental remedy 
for the potential trade gapj (b) development of trade with other areas in 
order to avoid the limitations imposed by traditional markets; (c) acceleration 
of the integration movement; and (d), application of an import policy 
designed to promote greater eff ic iency in the countries1 economic structure 
and process of growth through the rational allocation of resources. More 
spec i f ica l ly , th is means the ready access of primary commodities to the 
markets of the industrialized countries, regulation of commodity markets, 
expansion of exports of manufactures and semi-manufactures, promotion of 
trade with the soc ia l i s t countries and other developing areas, and the 
speeding up of the regional integration process. 
On the other hand, i t i s quite clear that of key significance among 
these objectives i s the immediate promotion of exports of manufactures 
and semi-manufactures. There are three main reasons for diversifying 
exports in this direction: one, to increase export earnings so as to 
narrow the current and potential trade gaps; two, to lessen the external 
vulnerability of the Latin American economies; and, three, to meet the 
demands of modern industrial development more e f f i c i e n t l y than in the 
pact. Regional integration and other means of expanding trade in manufactures 
and semi-manufactures in Latin America are a decisive step that should be 
taken immediately to forge the new structure of foreign trade. 
The object of exporting industrial products does not in any way mean that 
the region should slacken i t s international ef forts to improve the conditions 
and prospects for primary commodities, given their importance for the 
national economies and the fact that they account for more than 90 per cent 
of Latin America's export income. 
y The Commission of the Cartagena Agreement establishing the Andean 
Group recently adopted a decision on a common regime for the 
treatment of foreign capital and on trademarks, patents, l icenses 
and royalt ies , that marks an important step forward in this respect. 
/ ( i ) Commodity 
E/CN.12/$36/Reva 
Page 68 
( i ) Commodity exports. As noted earlier, the prospects for commodity-
exports are frankly unfavourable. This poses two major problems for the 
development strategy envisaged. One i s the limitations placed on the 
general process of economic growth by the trade gap, and the other the 
restrictions on the growth of production and income in the economic sectors 
concerned. It should be remembered, for instance, that agricultural 
exports represent 20 per cent of regional production, and the proportion 
i s a good deal higher for some items. The same applies to minerals and 
fuels , domestic production of which sometimes goes almost entirely to 
foreign markets. 
This creates conditions that hamper the absorption of manpower in 
productive ac t iv i t i e s and the achievement of the objectives that wi l l 
lead to a better distribution of income. Both aspects are of cardinal 
importance, especially in the agricultural sector, because of the gravity 
of the problem in the rural areas. If production in certain ac t iv i t i e s 
i s largely contingent on external demand and this wi l l be growing co 
slowly, any improvement in income distribution wi l l depend largely on what 
can be done to raise productivity per person employed, on the extent to 
which income i s redistributed in those same ac t iv i t i e s , and on the 
adjustments and transfers that can be made by the rest of the economy to help 
these sectors. The need to diversify production becomes increasingly urgent, 
and in extreme cases countries may even be faced with the problem of 
reasigning resources. 
Firm steps must therefore be taken at the international level to 
improve the prospects for exports of primary commodities. Efforts to 
achieve co-ordination must be redoubled so that Latin Americars legitimate 
demands can be presented to the industrialized countries in a more effect ive 
way. It i s more than necessary to consider the changes that should be 
made by the industrialized countries in their act iv i t i es on the international 
plane and to analyse the experience acquired over the last few years, 
particularly in the discussions and negotiations that have taken place 
in UNCTAD and GATT, since concrete results have been few and far between, and 
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i t has proved i m p o s s i b l e t o prevent t h e s i t u a t i o n from d e t e r i o r a t i n g s t i l l 
f u r t h e r o r t o s t o p c o n d i t i o n s t h a t are p r e j u d i c i a l t o L a t i n American t r a d e 
from becoming c o n s o l i d a t e d and s p r e a d i n g . 
The major objectives of the international action taken by the 
developing countries in matters of commodity trade have been defined in 
UNCTAD* They are the regulation of world markets, easier access to the 
industrialized countries1 markets, market diversi f icat ion, and the abolit ion 
of special preferences. 
International commodity agreements and arrangements and the 
establishment of tuffer stocks are the two main instruments for regulating 
the markets. Li t t le has been achieved as far as the conclusion of commodity 
agreements i s concerned, although there has been some progress, and this 
augurs better results in the future. There are no other means available, 
and i t only to be hoped that concerted action by the Latin American 
and other developing countries within the policy framework put forward 
in UiJCTAD wi l l lead to an increase in the number of agreements or to more 
talks leading to the conclusion of agreements of different kinds, depending 
on the characteristics of the products concerned. Those on coffee and 
sugar are highly encouraging examples of the development of theory and 
practice, now that agreements of that kind are seen to be reel instruments 
of market reorganization and planned action in the international sphere* 
As has already been said, the establishment of buffer stocks i s the 
other instrument for regulating markets. I t i s to be hoped that the 
statement on buffer stocks approved by the UNCTAD Committee on Commodities 
at the end of 1968, which reveals some advances in the negotiations and a 
greater willingness on the part of international agencies to help finance 
such stocks, may lead to more ef fect ive action. In this respect there has 
been some progress. In mid-1969 the International Monetary Fund decided 
that i t would extend assistance to members in connexion with the financing 
of buffer stocks by authorizing purchases up to a maximum of 50 per cent 
of quota. The World Bank also agreed to give consideration to requests 
for additional financing in connexion with a member's participation in the 
operation of a buffer stock, particularly for the construction of suitable 
storage f a c i l i t i e s . 
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At the second session of UNCTAD, no progress was made in regard to 
l iberal iz ing trade and gaining access for primary commodities to the 
markets of industrialized countries. The s ituation has been deteriorating 
for some time with the increase in the res tr ic t ions , the protective t a r i f f s 
and the development measures adopted by those countries. In th i s area, there 
are two clear-cut aims for the Latin American countries. As regards 
competitive products, de f in i te commitments must be obtained giving them 
a spec i f ic share in the consumption or in the consumption increment of 
the industrialized countries,^/ In the case of tropical commodities, the 
aim i s mainly to obtain the removal of the barriers^ restrict ions and 
charges which l imit their consumption in the developed countries, and the 
elimination of a l l discriminatory treatment prejudicial to the Latin American 
S ta te so^ 
5/ The problems of trade in agricultural products competing with the 
domestic production of the developed countries has been systematically 
analysed by the GATT A;-riculture Committee, which selected eight 
commodity groups for examination in the f i r s t stage of its work. Study 
proceeded in two directions: (a) an examination of the structure of 
world markets, identifying trends in the price and volume of trade, the 
importance of free and regulated markets, and non-commercial 
transactions; and (b) , an examination of the motives and general 
approach of production po l i c i e s , At a later stage the Committee 
established four working groups on spec i f ic problems: (1) Measures 
affect ing exports (subsidies, res t i tut ions , double-pricing practices, 
subsidized credits , non-commercial transactions); (2) Measures 
affect ing imports (quantitative res tr ic t ions , prohibitions, l icensing 
systems, discriminatory practices, t a r i f f quotas, customs duties and 
countervailing duties); (3) Measures af fect ing production (guaranteed 
or support prices, s e l f - su f f i c i ency ra t ios ) ; and (4) Other relevant 
measures, including sanitary regulations. 
6 / At the end of 1967, GATT decided to reactivate the Special Committee on 
Tropical Products to examine the problems of trade in tropical products 
and suggest means of resolving them. The Special Group agreed that i t 
should examine problems relat ing to customs duties, tax rates , systems 
of special preferences, competition from synthetics and subst i tutes , 
price s t a b i l i t y and markets, but i t has not yet reached the stage of 




Several procedures have been suggested for the elimination or gradual 
absorption of the special preferences accorded by some developed countries 
to certain developing nations, particularly by the European Economic 
Community to the Associated States. Nothing has been achieved so far, and 
these preferences are being extended to other countries and products, to 
the évident detriment of the Latin American region. Matters have been 
getting worse, not only because of the increase in recent years in the 
number of preferential agreements negotiated by the ECE with other countries, 
but because i f the United Kingdom and other European countries join the ECE 
the trading area covered by special preferential arrangements wi l l be 
considerably expanded. The proliferation of preferential arrangements and, 
in particular, of systems of reverse preferences, may have the e f fec t of 
delaying the entry into force of thé system of general preferences in 
accordance with the decisions adopted by the Special Committee on Preferences 
at the end of 1970. 
The solution to this problem i s complicated by the fact that the 
countries enjoying such preferences grant reverse preferences on imports 
from the developed countries with which they are associated. The Latin 
American States have already defined their policy on this question. They 
whole-heartedly support every kind of help that can be extended to the 
developing countries in the form of financial and technical co-operation, 
but they are opposed to any discriminatory treatment of these countries 
in the developed countries1 markets. The fact that such treatment i s s t i l l 
being applied i s a source of concern to Latin America, and i t tends to 
encourage moves to establish some kind of preferences between the Latin 
American countries and the United States. 
There can be absolutely no doubt that Latin America must persist 
in seeking a lasting general solution, which can only be the l iberalization 
of trade, since vertical arrangements that might lead to the establishment 
of regional blocs would ultimately injure v i ta l interests bound up with 
these countries1 future development. As the Latin American countries have 




absorbing those special preferences. In their new form, these agreements 
envisage, inter a l ia , the marketing of products of different exporters at 
stable and fair prices; they may also provide for the establishment of 
buffer stocks, and for technical and financial assistance in the 
implementation of national programmes for diversifying production. Commodity 
agreements therefore seem an appropriate instrument for protecting the 
interests of the countries enjoying preferences in industrialized countries, 
which may even gain by the change. 
The other aspect of the promotion of commodity exports i s the 
geographical diversif ication of markets. This should be a fundamental aim 
of Latin American foreign trade policy. In essence, i t consists in eluding 
to some extent the restrictions imposed by the traditional markets of 
industrialized countries and in achieving more stable and dynamic conditions 
for foreign trade. For example, Latin American exports to the United States 
show l i t t l e momentum, notwithstanding the economic and financial co-operation 
programme that was launched in the 1960s, Market diversif ication i s 
required not only for primary products but also for industrial exports, for 
which new poss ib i l i t i e s must be opened up. Consideration i s therefore 
being given to the advisability of promoting the expansion of trade with 
the soc ia l i s t countries and with other developing areas, and particularly 
to the necessity of accelerating the tempo of reciprocal trade in Latin 
America through regional and subregional integration, without excluding 
other agreements or programmes that may lead to the same resul t . 
Some progress has been made in recent years in trade with the 
soc ia l i s t countries, and the region i s anxious to tighten those l inks. The 
practical d i f f i c u l t i e s involved are well known, New experiments and new 
forms of agreement and new credit arrangements suggest interesting 
poss ib i l i t i es which may be of key importance for the expansion of Latin 
American trade in view of the market potential of the soc ia l i s t countries. 
The e f fect of introducing multilateral formulas in trade with that area 
would be f e l t immediately in increased trade. 
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L a t i n America's t r a d e w i t h o t h e r d e v e l o p i n g areas i s p r a c t i c a l l y 
n o n - e x i s t e n t , and a s tudy should be made o f t h e a c t u a l p r o s p e c t s i n t h i s 
f i e l d , a t l e a s t f o r some primary commodities and f o r manufactured goods 
i n g e n e r a l . Although t h e absence o f t r a d i t i o n a l t r a d e r e l a t i o n s , and such 
f a c t o r s a s g e o g r a p h i c a l l o c a t i o n , t r a n s p o r t c o s t s , e t c . , a re undoubted 
o b s t a c l e s t o t h e c r e a t i o n o f t h o s e new t r a d e f l o w s , some f a v o u r a b l e p r o s p e c t s 
are a l s o d i s c e r n i b l e . The i n d u s t r i a l i z e d c o u n t r i e s ' support may have t o 
be e n l i s t e d i n c a r r y i n g o u t such a programme, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n connexion w i th 
i t ems which are i n c l u d e d i n a i d t o d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s or i n which t r a d e 
i s promoted by means o f s u b s i d i e s o r s p e c i a l c o n c e s s i o n s . 
For some t ime now t r a d e n e g o t i a t i o n s have been under way w i t h i n 
GATT among a group o f d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s , i n c l u d i n g t h i r t e e n o f t h e 
t w e n t y - f o u r c o u n t r i e s i n t h e L a t i n American r e g i o n . I t i s to be hoped 
t h a t t h e s e n e g o t i a t i o n s w i l l have a f r u i t f u l outcome i n the near f u t u r e , 
s o t h a t t h e f o u n d a t i o n s can be e s t a b l i s h e d f o r expanding r e c i p r o c a l t r a d e 
among t h e d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s . 
( i i ) Exports of manufactures and semi-manufactures. In the traditional 
structure of Latin American exports, manufactured products have on average 
in recent years contributed only about 7 per cent of the region's total 
foreign exchange earnings."^ During the 1960s, exports of manufactures 
expanded rapidly, at the rate of 10 per cent annually, although for the 
region as a whole they are s t i l l at a low leve l . Over two-thirds of th i s 
increase i s accounted for by intra-regional trade, which indicates, on 
the one hand, highly encouraging progress in regional integration and, on 
the other, the scant development of these exports to other areas. One 
thing that i s somewhat surprising i s that the more industrialized countries 
of the region have not shown more interest in the past in gaining access to 
the world market for manufactures, although there has been progress in th i s 
respect, in recent years, especially in Brazil. 
7/ These exports include the products in sections 5> 6, 7 and'8 of the 
Standard International Trade Classification (SITC), excluding 
division 68 (non-ferrous metals). 
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As s t a t e d e a r l i e r , e s c o r t s o f manufactures r e p r e s e n t a v i t a l e lement 
i n a new L a t i n American development p o l i c y . N a t u r a l l y , the amount and 
p r a c t i c a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f such e x p o r t s may d i f f e r from country t o c o u n t r y ; 
but t o export manufactures should be the g e n e r a l aim o f a l l t h e L a t i n 
American c o u n t r i e s , l a r g e and s m a l l . There i s a g r e a t v a r i e t y o f manufactures 
and i n each i n d i v i d u a l c a s e f a v o u r a b l e c o n d i t i o n s can a lways be found f o r 
promoting t h e expor t o f p a r t i c u l a r i n d u s t r i a l p r o d u c t s . 
Changes have been t a k i n g p l a c e i n t h e c o m p o s i t i o n o f t r a d e i n 
manufactures between t h e i n d u s t r i a l i z e d c o u n t r i e s which may pave t h e way 
f o r i n c r e a s e d p a r t i c i p a t i o n by t h e d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s . I f t h e 
i n d u s t r i a l i z e d c o u n t r i e s speed up t h e p r o c e s s o f s p e c i a l i z a t i o n i n t h e 
product ion o f c a p i t a l - i n t e n s i v e goods r e q u i r i n g a h i g h degree o f t e c h n o l o g y , 
t h e d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s w i l l be a b l e t o b e n e f i t from t r a d e i n more 
l a b o u r - i n t e n s i v e t r a d i t i o n a l manufactures and i n goods which do not f i t 
t h e s p e c i a l i z a t i o n s o f t h e i n d u s t r i a l i z e d c o u n t r i e s o r t h e i r s c a l e s o f 
p r o d u c t i o n . While L a t i n America's i n d u s t r y must prepare i t s e l f t o take 
advantage o f t h e s e o p p o r t u n i t i e s , i t s expor t p o l i c y f o r manufactures must 
not be aimed s o l e l y a t a c h i e v i n g t h i s d i chotomy, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n v i ew 
o f t h e f a c t t h a t i t should g a i n much i n growth and e f f i c i e n c y as a r e s u l t 
o f i n t e g r a t i o n . 
I n t h e s h o r t term, t h e growth p o t e n t i a l o f e x p o r t s o f manufactures 
l i e s main ly i n t h e goods produced by e x i s t i n g i n d u s t r i e s which are 
c o m p e t i t i v e i n wor ld markets , and e s p e c i a l l y goods produced by l i g h t 
i n d u s t r y , i n which i t may be assumed t h a t L a t i n America has a c e r t a i n 
comparat ive a d v a n t a g e . However, i t i s p r e c i s e l y t h i s t y p e o f manufacture 
which i s most p r o t e c t e d i n t h e deve loped c o u n t r i e s ( c h i e f l y through 
p r o g r e s s i v e .customs t a r i f f s ) , and hence t h e growth o f such e x p o r t s a l s o 
depends on t h e d e v e l o p e d c o u n t r i e s ' g r a n t i n g e a s i e r a c c e s s t o t h e i r markets , 
a s c a l l e d f o r i n recommendations adopted by UNCTAD and GATT. 
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In the long term, export expansion should not be confined to these 
manufactures since, unless suitable programmes and policies are adopted 
to promote the development of more complex industrial exports embodying 
more advanced technology, the Latin American countries w i l l not only get 
l i t t l e benefit from technological progress, but wi l l have no share in 
the growth of the most dynamic sectors of world trade in manufactures. 
To get the Latin American economies to export manufactures w i l l not 
be easy task because of the conditions and habits established by import-
saving industry. Nevertheless, the experience that comes from regional 
integration, the multinational projects that are being developed, and the 
growing capacity and experience of industry - despite a l l i t s weaknesses -
give good grounds for hope that, i f energetic pol icies are applied, success 
wi l l be achieved. In this respect, increasing trade in manufactures and 
gradually increasing competition within the region wi l l strengthen Latin 
American industry and give i t new opportunities to enter world markets. 
I t must not be forgotten that any preferences that the industrialized 
countries may grant wi l l be worth nothing unless the countries of the 
region are in a position to take advantage of them. The lessons of 
regional integration are very instructive in this respect, since i t has 
often been found that preferences alone do not promote new investment or 
increase trade in a larger and protected market. Moreover, margins of 
preference have gradually been reduced because of the l iberal izat ion of 
t a r i f f s among the industrialized countries. Hence, the incentives that 
preferences themselves provide wi l l be less ef fect ive than was anticipated. 
This means that i t w i l l be more d i f f i c u l t for the Latin American countries 
to compete, and as time goes on their d i f f i c u l t i e s wi l l increase because 
of the extraordinary dynamism of the industrialized countries* trade and also 
because of the ground gained ty other developing countries. 
This i s an area in which there i s a clear-cut need for national and 
international action to converge so that specif ic results can be achieved 
in exports of manufactures. At the national l eve l , studies are needed of 
each country's prospects of expanding domestic production for export and 
of establishing new export-oriented industries. In th i s , and in studies of 
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the market potential of the developed countries, international and regional 
agencies can provide very valuable technical assistance, In addition, 
efforts wi l l have to be made to deal with the inst i tutional problems 
connected with the organization and eff ic iency of national enterprises, to 
improve quality and reduce costs, to f i x specif ic priorit ies for the 
allocation of resources in development plans, to consider the problems of 
exchange rates and regulations and the inst i tut ional and financial machinery 
required for subsidies - in a word, to develop a comprehensive export 
promotion and marketing policy. 
At the international level there has been recent progress in this 
respect. In late 1 9 7 0 the UNCTAD Special Committee on Preferences' approved 
the basis for the establishment of a system of generalized non-reciprocal 
and non-discriminatory preferences in favour of the exports of the 
developing countries. The conclusions state that the developed countries 
wi l l ôeek leg i s la t ive or other appropriate authority to enable them to 
put the concessions negotiated into ef fect during 1971» The one point of 
concern that s t i l l remains regarding the system of generalized preferences 
i s that the exception l i s t s contain precisely the manufactures, such as 
t e x t i l e s , footwear and certain processed agricultural products, that offer 
immediate opportunities for expanding the developing countries1 exports. 
Furthermore, care wi l l have to be taken to see that the system of 
preferences adopted i s not rendered ineffect ive by the application of 
non-tariff restrictions or the use of escape clauses. In actual fact , 
as noted above, owing to the process of trade l iberalization, margins of 
preference have been reduced and the problem of access to the markets of 
the developed countries i s now more a question of dealing with non-^tariff 
restrictions and with a sliding scale of import t a r i f f s , which r ise 
steeply with the amount of processing a product receives. 
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( i i i ) Import policy, A rational import policy must be designed and 
implemented which wi l l be in l ine with the essential aims of the development 
strategy. While there has been some recent progress, chief ly in the revision 
of t a r i f f s , the general trend in Latin America has been one of over-all 
control of imports, with drastic cutbacks in times of balance-of-payments 
c r i s i s . In many cases, economic cr i ter ia , aimed at making more e f f i c i en t 
use of foreign exchange, have been invoked to l imit , for example, imports 
of luxury goods. But in the import substitution process set in motion by 
the demand for these goods on the domestic market, larger amounts of foreign 
exchange were soon required to finance imports of the intermediate and 
capital goods used, direct ly or indirectly to produce the very goods that 
were supposed to have been restricted. 
Careful planning, and increasing competition in the larger markets 
established by integration agreements and also from extra-regional trade 
flows, wi l l be of great benefit in promoting eff ic iency and productivity in 
domestic production. Undeniably, as exports of goods, particularly 
manufactures, within the region and outside i t increase, and as domestic 
economic act ivi ty gains momentum, Latin America w i l l be in a better 
position to implement a mote f lex ible import policy and a more select ive 
tar i f f policy, governed by considerations of economic expediency. The 
experience of the industrialized countries and of developing countries 
whose external sector i s more dynamic than that of Latin America indicates 
that much i s to be gained by promoting some degree of special ization within 
the context of a growing diversif ication of economic act iv i ty . 
I t cannot be over-emphasized that import policy i s the basic 
instrument for the implementation of over-all development strategy. Direct 
control measures, protection, the structure and level of t a r i f f s , exchange 
regulations and the various forms of subsidy must a l l meet the needs of 
integration and the promotion of exports of manufactures and also be in l ine 
with the over-all aim of building up a more e f f i c i ent industry. The 




towards achieving the essential objectives of increasing investment in 
production, and agrarian reform, which wi l l raise employment and income 
leve ls and redistribute income in accordance with each country's own 
economic arri social goals, 
(c) External co-operation 
It has been seen that , notwithstanding differences in degree, the 
balance-of-payments situation and prospects are extremely unfavourable, and 
this has a very strong impact because Latin America re l i es on external 
capital inflows to maintain the growth rate within the context of the 
pol ic ies i t has been pursuing. The projections show that the avai labi l i ty 
of funds i s l ike ly to be severely reduced, and that the cost of financing 
i s r is ing, not only because of higher interest rates, but also because 
bilateral loans continue to be " t i ed" .^ 
Latin America wi l l never be able to lay the foundations for i t s 
development i f i t continues to deal with the external bottleneck by 
adopting pal l iat ives such as increased external borrowing. Undoubtedly, 
the most positive and ef fect ive assistance the industrialized countries 
should give would be to adopt measures and change their pol icies so as to 
f a c i l i t a t e the access of Latin America's exports to their markets at 
stable and remunerative prices, and to give an immediate boost to i t s 
exports of manufactures and semi-manufactures. In the meantime, unti l 
these objectives are achieved, financial assistance wi l l be required on 
terms and conditions that do not lead to the same crises as at present; 
in other words, what i s needed i s an increase in the net flows of funds 
and services and a decrease in the real cost of external financing. 
The main objectives that should, be set for international action in 
this respect have been defined in UNCTAD. In brief , they cover the 
commitments that the developed countries should make to increase their 
8 / In this connexion, i t should be noted that certain measures have been 
taken to improve the terms under which the United States makes loans 




net transfers of resources, changes in the terms and conditions of aid, 
multilateralization, and the adjustment of servicing payments on the external 
debt at times of c r i s i s . The various proposals on these points now under 
discussion are well known, particularly those presented by the Latin American 
countries through the Special Committee on Latin American Co-ordination 
(CECLA). 
I t cannot be over-emphasized however, that among the objectives which 
are of special significance to Latin America at present are increasing 
the proportion of external financing which consists of aid and of long-term 
loans at low interest rates and with extended grace periods, providing 
mere f lex ible conditions for adjustments in times of financial c r i s i s , 
and more rapid progress towards the elimination of restrict ions on the use 
of bi lateral loans. 
In terms of over-all development strategy, the growing 
multilateralization of external financial assistance and the practical 
application of the principle that development plans should receive 
financing are of particular significance. Countries must be able to rely 
on receiving the basic external resources they have budgeted for in their 
plans, and on supplementary assistance to o f f se t any disruptions caused 
by unexpected declines in export receipts or by other emergencies; these 
topics also have been considered in UNCTAD. 

